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LONG ON RHETORIC, SHORT ON RESULTS:
AGILE METHODS AND CYBER ACQUISITIONS IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Major Daniel E. Schoeni, USAF†
What is of the greatest importance in war is speed.1
— Sun Tzu
Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.2
— General Robert H. Barrow, USMC
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INTRODUCTION
Cyber warfare has arrived. The Department of Defense (DoD) is
under attack, and our security is at stake. Yet in a field defined by its
rapid growth, the DoD arms itself at the same pace that that it buys
major weapons systems, an acquisition cycle of 7–10 years. It thus buys
obsolete cyber-defense tools. The “arsenal of democracy”3 has already
provided us the tools for overcoming this impediment in the form of
agile software-development methods. Yet the DoD has been reluctant
to set aside decades of experience and utilize different methods for
software than it does for other acquisitions. But unless it does so, it may
well lose its edge, and not only in the cyber domain.
The next four sections will proceed as follows. The first describes
the growing threat of cyberattacks generally, discusses how they affect
the DoD and our security specifically, and then explains the
relationship between DoD cybersecurity and rapid-cyber
procurement.4 The second summarizes agile software development—
3. Though it was FDR who made this phrase famous in his eponymous speech on
December 29, 1940, it was industrialist Bill Knudson who coined the term. After a successful
career at Ford and GM, Knudson was chosen to head up the National Defense Advisory Council,
the group charged with retooling America’s peacetime economy for war. See ARTHUR HERMAN,
FREEDOM’S FORGE: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESS PRODUCED VICTORY DURING WW II 69–71, 115,
129 (2012).
4. This paper is not the first to suggest the connection between cybersecurity and
acquisition practices. In fact, on January 23, 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Daniel
M. Tangherlini of the General Services Administration wrote a memorandum to the assistants to
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its history, methods, and track record. The third recounts the history of
federal and DoD IT acquisitions and the DoD’s attempt at agile
reforms. Though underway for a decade or more, there is little to show
for it. The last section focuses on the analysis of why agile has not taken
root, how to foster such reforms in the DoD, and benefits that may
accrue.
I.

BACKGROUND

This section first considers cyberspace dangers generally, then the
unique threat to the DoD, and finally problems with its acquisitions
practices. After discussing these dangers and the DoD’s
unpreparedness in this domain, the next section turns to the agile
method as alternative to the current software-development model.
To avoid any confusion, it bears mentioning that this paper uses
the terms cyber, software, and information technology (IT) almost
interchangeably—the first as an adjective, and the latter two as nouns
for the same concept. Although both the introduction and background
that follows concentrate on cybersecurity, concerns about software
development and acquisition practices apply more broadly. Because the
DoD relies on software for more than cyberattack and defense,5 its
acquisition practices are of wider concern. Thus, while there are
admittedly differences between cyber, software, and IT,6 they are
related terms and this paper will not dwell on their distinctions.
the president for homeland security and economic affairs forwarding a study on this subject.
IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH ACQUISITION: FINAL REPORT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, S.C493D22 (2013).
5. See infra note 25.
6. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE reports that “cyber” is an adjective that
first came into use in 1992 meaning “of, relating to, or involving (the culture of) computers, virtual
reality, and or the Internet.” Cyber Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://
www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/250878?rskey=V6b5Z3&result=1#eid (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014). It reports that “information technology” is a noun and relatively older term coming
into use in 1952 referring to the “branch of technology concerned with the dissemination,
processing, and storage of information, esp. by means of computers.” Information Technology
Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view
/Entry/273052?redirectedFrom=information+technology#eid (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). And it
reports that “software” came into use almost a decade later (1960) and signifies the “programs
and procedures required to enable a computer to perform a specific task, as opposed to the physical
components of the system.” Software Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://
www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/183938?redirectedFrom=software#eid (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014). There are some obvious distinctions among the terms. For example, IT and software
have overlapping but not coextensive definitions; the former encompasses not only software but
also hardware, the latter only software. Further, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) has its
own definitions for these terms that differ in some respects from the common usage. See, e.g.,
FAR 2.101 (making a distinction between the term “computer software,” which means, “programs

08_ARTICLE_SCHOENI (DO NOT DELETE)

388

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

6/15/2015 11:39 AM

[Vol. 31

A. Hackers, Cyberattacks, and the Need for Cybersecurity
The fight for security, in both private and public sectors, is part of
what Michael Gross calls “World War 3.0” in his eponymous Vanity
Fair article.7 He explains that the Web’s openness makes users
vulnerable to “various kinds of hacking, including corporate and
government espionage, personal surveillance, the hijacking of Web
traffic, and remote manipulation of computer-controlled military and
industrial processes.”8
Consistent with Gross’s account, reports of cybercrime,9 large
companies being hacked,10 and cyberattacks on government agencies11
that comprise a series of instructions, rules, routines, or statements, regardless of the media in
which recorded, that allow or cause a computer to perform a specific operation or series of
operations” and the term “computer data bases”); see also JAMES G. MCEWEN, DAVID S. BLOCH,
RICHARD M. GRAY & JOHN T. LUCAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS:
PROTECTING AND ENFORCING IP AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVEL 76–83 (2d ed. 2012)
(explaining the definitions of computer software and related terms under the FAR and DFARS).
7. Michael Gross, World War 3.0, VANITY FAIR (May 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com
/news/2012/05/internet-regulation-war-sopa-pipa-defcon-hacking.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Harris et al., Sneaky Path Into Target Customers’ Wallets, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A1 (describing Eastern European hackers’ $18 billion theft from
consumers using debit cards at Target); The Digital Arms Trade, ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21574478-market-software-helps-hackers-penetrate
-computer-systems-digital-arms-trade/ (describing the market of selling software “exploits” to
organized crime and terror groups); Richard A. Clarke, Stop Ignoring Online Thieves, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2013, at A17 (claiming cybercrime is a multi-billion dollar industry); Misha Glenny,
MCMAFIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE GLOBAL CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD 264–86 (2008)
(detailing Brazilian mafia’s cybercrime connections with Russia).
10. See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Apple Hit by Hackers who Attacked Facebook, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 2013, at A12 (explaining that hackers attacked both companies exploiting a
backdoor in Oracle’s Java program to insert malware); Nicole Perlroth, American Banks’ Sites
Are Attacked By Hackers, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 5, 2013, at B2 (describing attacks on Bank of America,
Citigroup, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo, and PNC by al-Qassam group “in retaliation for an anti-Islam
video”); David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Cyberattacks on the Rise Against U.S. Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2013, at A6 (warning of new attacks against businesses coming from the
Middle East seeking to interfere with industrial machinery); U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission Report, CQ CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Nov. 20, 2013 (citing U.S. Cyber
Command estimate that U.S. companies lose $250 billion annually to espionage); Nathaniel
Popper, Wall Street’s Exposure To Hacking Laid Bare, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at B1 (detailing
indictment of two hackers who gained access to NASDAQ for two years); see also Danny Palmer,
A Third of SMBs Unaware They’ve Been Cyber Attack Victims, COMPUTING (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2307942/a-third-of-smbs-unaware-theyve-been-cyber
-attack-victims (reporting that small businesses are under attack, but often lack the resources to
know it); CLINT WITCHALLS, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INFORMATION RISK: MANAGING
DIGITAL ASSETS IN A NEW TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE 10 (James Chambers ed., 2013), available
at http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/analysis/information-risk (reporting
that small businesses are sometimes special targets of cyberattacks).
11. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-661T, CYBER THREATS AND
VULNERABILITIES PLACE FEDERAL SYSTEMS AT RISK (2009) (summary of Congressional
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have become so common that they barely register.12 Yet, though we
may be inured, our networks are not, and our economy and way of life
have come to depend on the Internet.
These threats come from a variety of sources including state
actors, organized crime, and assorted anarchists. At present, state actors
are most sophisticated,13 with organized crime close at heel.14 Yet while
anarchist groups’ skills were once modest, or at least not widely

testimony); Australia Police, Central Bank Websites Hacked, PHYS ORG (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://phys.org/news/2013-11-australia-police-central-bank-websites.html; Steven Stalinsky,
China Isn’t the Only Source of Cyberattacks, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2013, at A17 (reporting that
Tunisian Cyber Army and al-Qaeda Electronic Army hacked the DoD, State Department, and
Department of Homeland Security); William Wan & Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Cyberspying Hits
More Than 140 Targets, Report Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2013, at A08 (citing Mandiant report
indicating that a dozen agencies had been infiltrated); Lisa Rein, Virus Infects Computers at
Commerce Dept. Agency, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/commerce-agencys-system-infected-by-virus-may-be-victim-of-cyber-attack/2012/02/02/gIQA
ViHWlQ_story.html (describing attack that forced the Department of Commerce to shut down
internet access for 10 days); Paul Elias, Federal Agencies Pursue Anonymous, WASH. POST, Sep.
12, 2011, at A23 (reporting that LulzSec, an Anonymous affiliate, hacked the CIA’s website);
William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain Subtitle: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89
FOREIGN AFF. 97 (2010) (confirming a successfully attack on U.S. Central Command in 2008
using infected flash drives, previous reports suggested Russia was to blame); John Markoff, China
Link Suspected In Hacking Of Arms LabFolder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, at A40 (reporting that
the Chinese hacked into the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee where nuclear weapons
research is conducted). Moreover, this threat not only affects the federal government, but also
affects states and local government. See, e.g., John Stephenson & Karla Jones, Fighting Cyber
Warfare at the State Level, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2013, at A11 (describing numerous threats
including “hackers breaking into power grids, communications networks and other critical
systems, wreaking havoc by rendering these systems useless during an emergency”).
12. Common as reports are, they likely underreport the frequency of attacks. Businesses
are secretive about when they have been hacked as “publishing specific details about hacks will
highlight weak spots, or at least point to where most attention or resources are being deployed,”
and “even talking about cyber-attacks can attract more attention from cyber-attackers.” James
Chambers, Cracking the Code of Silence, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Nov. 20, 2013),
http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/opinion/code-silence.
13. See, e.g., BRANDON VALERIANO & RYAN C. MANESS, CYBER WAR VERSUS CYBER
REALITIES: CYBER CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 25 (2015) (explaining that large
state actors “seem to be the most dominant cyber actors because they have the resources,
manpower, and money to support massive cyber operations”).
14. See, e.g., Caroline Fairchild, Target Security Breach Likely to Be ‘Highly Sophisticated
Organized Crime,’ FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/12/19/tar get-security
-breach-likely-to-be-highly-sophisticated-organized-crime/ (reporting that organized crime’s
hacking skills are increasingly sophisticated); Steve Ranger, Organized Cybercrime Groups Are
now as Powerful as Nations, ZDNET, Jun. 9, 2014, http://www.zdnet.com/article/organised-cyber
crime-groups-are-now-as-powerful-as-nations/ (describing the proliferation of cybercrime as
“hackers share skills to build complex attacks to steal cash and intellectual property”); Cyber
Security: Protecting America’s New Frontier, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism
& Homeland Security, 121st Cong. 5 (2011) (warning that “cyber crime on the rise with criminal
syndicates operating with increasing sophistication”).
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distributed among their ranks,15 their sophistication increases daily and
poses a growing cause for concern.16
Perhaps the best indicator of how serious all of this has become is
that government is not alone in the effort to steel itself against the
growing threat.17 The private sector has likewise taken notice.
Cybersecurity has become a multi-billion dollar industry.18 Firms have
started buying cyber insurance.19 And some advocate for their right to
“hack back” when they are attacked.20 Some commentators argue the
private sector nevertheless underestimates the dangers and spends less
than it should on cyber self-defense.21 In any event, the private sector’s
growing awareness of, and efforts to protect itself from, cyberattacks
suggest that cybersecurity risks are as ubiquitous as they are real.22
15. See PARMY OLSON, WE ARE ANONYMOUS 36–37, 80 (2012) (describing methods of
early attacks by Anonymous members as effective yet technically unsophisticated and their
evolution since then).
16. See Jim Finkle & Joseph Minn, Exclusive: FBI Warns of U.S. Government Breaches by
Anonymous Hackers, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/us
-usa-security-anonymous-fbi-idUSBRE9AE17C20131115 (giving Anonymous credit for
exploiting flaws in Adobe software to hack into “U.S. Army, Department of Energy, Department
of Health and Human Services, and perhaps many more agencies”).
17. See, e.g., Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78
Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013) (explaining that the “cyber threat to critical infrastructure
continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges”).
18. Press Release, Gartner Says Worldwide Security Market to Grow 8.7 Percent in 2013,
(June 11, 2013), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2512215 (announcing that cybersecurity
would reach an estimated $67.2 billion in 2013 and projecting $86 billion in 2016); see also
ECONOMIST, Cyber-Security: White Hats To The Rescue, Feb. 22, 2014, at 55–56 (describing a
growing market for “white hat” hackers to do penetration tests to identify cybersecurity
weaknesses).
19. See James Willhite, On Alert Against Cybercrime—More CFOs Weigh Insurance
Against Data Breaches, Despite Limits on Coverage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2013, at B6 (citing a
survey showing that 31% of firms buy business insurance largely due to cybersecurity threats).
But see STEPHEN E. FLYNN & DANIEL B. PRIETO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR NO. 13,
NEGLECTED DEFENSE: MOBILIZING THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO SUPPORT HOMELAND SECURITY 23–
24 (2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-security/neglected-defense/p10457
(arguing that cybersecurity insurance won’t take off without government engagement).
20. Christopher M. Matthews, Cybertheft Victims Itchy to Retaliate, WALL ST. J., June 3,
2013, at B6 (describing the business community’s growing support for responding to hackers in
kind)); James Podgers, Should Hacked Firms Be Cybercops?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/should_hacked_firms_be_cybercops/ (recounting a panel
on active cyber defense and referencing ABA’s ongoing work in this area); PAUL ROSENZWEIG,
CYBER WARFARE: HOW CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE ARE CHALLENGING AMERICA AND
CHANGING THE WORLD 69 (2013) (noting the possibility of issuing letters of marque and reprisal
to private companies under the U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 11).
21. See, e.g., id. 157–65 (providing an economic rationale for the private market’s
underspending on cybersecurity given the high level of threat posed).
22. One need look no farther than one’s own wallet to see evidence of the private sector’s
growing efforts to protect consumers from mounting cybersecurity threats. Following last year’s
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B. Cyberattacks on the DoD and National Security.
Far from being immune to the increasing risks just described, the
DoD faces even greater cyber threats because it is such an attractive
target.23 That is not only due to its dominance, but also because it is so
dependent on IT.24 To illustrate, 90% of weapons systems’ functionality
relies on software.25 So cyber warfare tempts our “adversaries because
it poses a significant risk at low cost.”26 Indeed, such adversaries scan
DoD networks millions of times a day searching for weaknesses, and
weaknesses they have found, thereby pilfering blueprints to some of
our most advanced weapons.27 This is no longer the stuff of science
fiction or far-fetched airport spy thrillers. High-stakes cyber espionage
has arrived.
The DoD recognizes the threats, and has instituted plans for
preventing, defending from, and mitigating them.28 It has also taken
some steps to shore up the security of the industrial base,29 which not
only houses state-of-the-art weapons designs but has proven quite
attack on Target, see Harris et al., supra note 9, U.S. banks have announced they will adopt cards
with embedded chips affording better security. Joe Nocera, Dogged by Data Theft, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2014, at A27 (describing the efforts to adopt the European-style “chip-and-PIN” card that
both “encrypts data and authenticates the card”).
23. DAVI D’AGOSTINO & GREG WILSHUSEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO11-75, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CYBER EFFORTS: DOD FACES CHALLENGES IN ITS CYBER
ACTIVITIES 1–2 (2011).
24. Id. (noting that although the DoD operates 7 million computers and 10,000 networks it
failed to appreciate the danger until its inept response to a malware attack in 2008 “exposed the
weakness of the DoD’s command and control authorities . . . for cyberspace operations”).
25. REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6 (2009)
(explaining that software accounted for only 20% of weapons’ functionality in 1970, increased to
80% in 2000, and now accounts for 90%) (citing DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
DEFENSE SOFTWARE (2000); PROGRAM MANAGER’S GUIDE FOR MANAGING SOFTWARE (2001));
see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRITICAL CODE: SOFTWARE PRODUCIBILITY FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 17–19 (2010) (explaining that software “is increasingly used to
embody the functionality of defense systems of all kinds” and “at the core of the ability to achieve
integration and maintain agility” of the use of technology as “force multiplier”); Barry Boehm,
Richard Turner, & Peter Kind, Risky Business: Seven Myths About Software Engineering That
Impact Defense Acquisitions, 31 PROGRAM MANAGER (2002) (quoting an Air Force General
saying, “About the only thing you can do with an F-22 without software is take a picture of it.”).
26. D’AGOSTINO & WILSHUSEN, supra note 23, at 1–2.
27. Id.
28. See QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 37–39 (2010) (“Operating Successfully in
Cyberspace”).
29. See, e.g., Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Safeguarding
Unclassified Controlled Technical Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 69273 (final rule issued Nov. 18,
2013) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. parts 204, 212, 252) (adding DFARS clause requiring defense
contractors to report to the DoD when sensitive information has been compromised, e.g., cyber
espionage).
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vulnerable to espionage.30 One expert testified that the Chinese have
stolen plans for the F-35 from Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman,
and BAE,31 and another 50 weapons systems, including Patriot and
Aegis missile defense systems, V-22 Osprey, F/A-18 fighter, and
Littoral Combat Ship have also been stolen.32 That is to list only
examples of espionage, while the DoD faces a wider range of threats.33
Collectively, “such threats,” James Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence, has said, “pose a critical national and economic security
concern.”34 Federal acquisition policy and practice play an important
role in addressing these threats.35

30. See, e.g., MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING THE THREAT OF ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER
ESPIONAGE UNITS (2012) (uncovering cyber espionage against 151 U.S. companies committed
over seven years); Danny Yadron, Chinese Hacked U.S. Military Contractors, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE (Sept. 18, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinese-hacked-u-s-military-contractorssenate-panel-says1410968094?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_news (writing that Chinese hackers have
broken into computer networks of private transportation companies working for the U.S. military
20 times in the past year); see also DFARS Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical
Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 69273 (Nov. 18, 2013) (codified as 48 C.F.R. Parts 204, 212, 252)
(adding clause to safeguard information held by defense contractors).
31. CYBER ESPIONAGE AND THE THEFT OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TECHNOLOGY (2013) (testimony of Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20130709/101104/HHRG-113-IF02-Wstate-WortzelL20130709-U1.pdf.
32. Id. (citing Ellen Nakashima, Confidential Report Lists U.S. Weapons System Designs
POST
(May
27,
2013),
Compromised
by
Chinese
Cyberspies,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/confidential-report-lists-us-weaponssystem-designs-compromised-by-chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b0b5e9247e8ca_story.html).
33. For example, fighter jets make attractive targets for hackers because of “their reliance
on software and information technology,” and controlling the software is to control the hardware.
See Brendan McGarry, Is the F-35’s Computer R2-D2 or HAL?, DEFENSETECH (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://defensetech.org/2014/02/19/is-the-f-35s-computer-r2-d2-or-hal/ (citing David Martin, Is
the F-35 Worth It?, 60 MINUTES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/f-35-joint-strikefighter-60-minutes/; Can the U.S. Military’s New Jet Fighter Be Hacked?, 60 MINUTES OVERTIME
(Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-the-f-35-be-hacked/ (describing the risk of
cyberattacks on “ALIS,” the F-35 fighter jet’s onboard computer). The author is indebted to
Steven Schooner for alerting him of this report.
34. GREGORY C. WILHUSEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-12-666T,
CYBERSECURITY: THREATS IMPACTING THE NATION 1 (2012) (summary of Congressional
testimony) (citing JAMES L. CLAPPER, UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD ON THE
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (2012)).
35. See IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH ACQUISITION, supra note
4 (making recommendations to the president on the “feasibility, security benefits, and relative
merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning and contract administration”).
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C. The DoD and Cyber Acquisitions
In 1965, Intel’s founder Gordon Moore famously predicted that
computer processing power would double every year,36 later revising
that prediction to two years.37 His prediction has held true for the last
five decades, and we have seen exponential growth rates in various
measures of technological growth, including processing speed,
memory capacity, and digital camera pixels.38 Such rapid growth is
significant for our increasingly cyber-dependent military, which relies
not only on instantaneous worldwide communication but also on
military hardware whose functionality heavily depends on software.39
“In short,” wrote the Defense Science Board, “more software, means
more vulnerability.”40
This weakness is not lost on our adversaries.41 It is compounded
by the DoD’s longstanding problem with slow IT acquisition, which
the Obama-Biden transition team in 2009 aptly called “fundamentally
broken.”42 While cyberattacks happen in mere seconds,43 IT acquisition
is measured in months and years.44 With a few exceptions discussed
later, the DoD purchases software like major weapons systems,45 and
36. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38
ELECTRONICS MAG. (Apr. 19, 1965).
37. See Gordon E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, 21 IEDM TECH.
DIGEST 11, 11–13 (1975), available at http://www.lithoguru.com/scientist/CHE323/Moore
1975.pdf.
38. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING AND SUSTAINING THE NEW ECONOMY:
ENHANCING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (Dale W. Jorgenson & Charles
W. Wessner eds., 2006). Though “processing speed is no longer increasing at this rate,” DEFENSE
SCIENCE BOARD REPORT supra note 25 at 7, quantum computers may soon overcome this barrier.
See, e.g., Quentin Hardy, A Big Leap To Quantum Computing, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2013, at B11.
39. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 6 (explaining software currently
provides 90% or more of a weapon’s system’s functionality).
40. Id. at 17.
41. See id.
42. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 28–29 (2010).
43. Id. at 23 (explaining that “cyber attacks on IT systems used to be lengthy, planned-out
attacks, but now automated scanning, analysis, and global sharing of attack vectors enable attack
cycles to occur in minutes and sometimes seconds”).
44. Id. (explaining the “overall portfolio of DOD IT programs has experienced a 21-month
delay in delivering initial operational capability to the war fighter, and 14 percent are more than
four years late”) (citing KATHERINE V. SCHINASI, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO08-782T, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: BETTER WEAPON PROGRAM OUTCOMES REQUIRE DISCIPLINE,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT 5 (2008)
(Congressional testimony)).
45. Many have argued that the process does not work well for major weapons systems
either. See, e.g., Secretary Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon
for a New Age, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 2009) (arguing that the Pentagon’s acquisition system
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this is a process that can take 7–10 years from planning to delivery.46
That the rest of the government has similar problems is of only small
consolation,47 as these are not only life and death matters for the
individual warfighter, but also bear on our military readiness and
national security more generally. In short, defending from cyberattacks
and developing state-of-the-art cyber weapons depend on acquisition
that moves on par with the pace of technological growth. Though the
DoD far outspends its strategic rivals,48 volume will be to no avail if its
weapons are already obsolete when fielded.49 And as important as
superior technology can be to warfare,50 it can be fleeting51—all the
more so if our acquisitions move at a much slower pace than that at
which technology changes.

is “baroque” and that deployed warfighters need solutions that can be fielded in months and weeks
rather than in years); MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-081159T, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE WEAPON
PROGRAM OUTCOMES 1–3 (2008) (testifying that “continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver
fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned” despite GAO warnings since 1990).
46. Colin Clark, Army Cyber Chief Meets Buyers In Pursuit Of Faster Acquisition,
BREAKING DEFENSE (Oct. 22, 2013), http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/army-cyber-chief
-meets-buyers-in-pursuit-of-faster-acquisition/.
47. See, e.g., Clay Johnson & Harper Reed, Op-Ed, Why the Government Never Gets Tech
Right, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, available at http://nyti.ms/1DWmXtK (reporting that in the last
10 years more than half of all large federal IT programs have been delayed and 41% have failed
users’ expectations); Katherine M. John, Information Technology Procurement in the United
States and Canada: Reflecting on the Past with an Eye Toward the Future, 48 PROCUREMENT
LAWYER 4, 5 (2013) (noting “a recurrent criticism of federal government IT is that it fails to keep
pace with private sector advancements”); Steven Brill, Code Red, TIME, Mar. 10, 2014, at 26
(recounting the story of the private sector experts who rescued the HealthCare.gov Website).
48. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY
BALANCE 548–54 (2013) (providing tables illustrating that the United States’ disproportionate
defense spending compared with other nations); David Wessel, Everything You Ever Wanted To
Know About The Budget But Were Afraid to Ask, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12, 2012, at C3 (reporting that
the “U.S. defense budget is greater than the combined defense budgets of the next 17 largest
spenders”).
49. Further, money cannot buy timely software delivery. Counterintuitively, Brooks’s Law
says assigning more manpower to a troubled software project can actually slow down
development. See FRED BROOKS, THE MYTHICAL MAN MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE
ENGINEERING 25, 274 (1975).
50. See infra note 56 (describing the distinct advantages of superior technology in warfare).
51. P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
21ST CENTURY 238–41 (2009) (warning about the risk of complacency about superior American
technology).
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Military and political leaders recognize that this must change.52
Several studies have reached this conclusion,53 and the Defense Science
Board warned:
The deliberate process through which weapon systems and
information technology are acquired by DOD cannot keep pace with
the speed at which new capabilities are being introduced in today’s
information age—and the speed with which potential adversaries
can procure, adapt, and employ those same capabilities against the
United States.54

The DoD recently concluded that rapid IT-acquisition processes are
“vital to national security” and is adjusting its policies and strategies
accordingly.55 Later sections will consider how effective those efforts
have been, explain why they have largely failed to deliver, and offer
52. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 46 (Army’s top cyber commander saying “he wanted to buy
‘faster, better, quicker’ since the cyber realm doesn’t really allow for the seven to 10 years a
standard acquisition program usually takes.”); Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon to Fast-Track
Cyberweapons Acquisition, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2012, at A3 (reporting that Pentagon officials
recognize that sometimes “risk to operations and personnel” caused by slow cyber acquisitions
“is unacceptable”); Amber Corin, Navy: Faster Acquisition Key to Cyber Defense, FCW (June 28,
2011), http://fcw.com/articles/2011/06/28/cyber-warfare-summit-acquisition-reform-strategies
.aspx (reporting that “existing acquisition model . . . is ill-equipped to meet the fast-moving needs
of cyber defense”); Bob Brewin, Air Force Cyber Chief: Speed Up Acquisitions Already,
NEXTGOV (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2012/02/air-force-cyber-chief-speed
-up-acquisitions-already/50600/ (Air Force Space Command’s top general lamenting that DoD
“acquires cyber capabilities the same way it buys aircraft or satellites,” which “can take years,
while new developments in computer hardware and software can happen in days or months”);
Rex B. Reagan & David F. Rico, Lean and Agile Acquisition and Systems Engineering: A
Paradigm Whose Time Has Come, DEF. AT&L, Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 48, 52 (quoting General David
H. Petraeus who called for “adaptive, responsive, and speedy acquisitions” because our enemies
are “unlike any enemy fought in the past, demonstrating different tactics, techniques, and
procedures from those found in conventional warfare”).
53. See, e.g., ISAAC R. PORCHE III ET AL., RAPID ACQUISITION & FIELDING FOR
INFORMATION ASSURANCE & CYBER SECURITY IN THE NAVY iii (2013) (explaining that “today’s
acquisition approach is not geared toward cyber security,” that we need “a cyber acquisition
process that can react much faster than formal [DoD] channels, and that “the primary reason for
this need is that many cyber technologies and products have fast development and deployment
cycles that must be matched with rapid acquisition processes to avoid obsolescence when
deployed”); MARY ANN LAPHAM ET AL., AGILE METHODS: SELECTED DOD MANAGEMENT AND
ACQUISITION CONCERNS 2–3 (Carnegie Mellon Software Eng’g Inst., 2011) (describing need for
“acquisition tempos that respond to operational tempos” and that the warfighter is endangered if
he doesn’t have what he needs when he needs it); CARLTON NORTHERN ET AL., MITRE CORP.,
HANDBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTING AGILE IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION (2010) (holding that “heavyweight” processes for major weapons are
ill-suited to IT because when “finally fielded, the technology is dated and the functionality needed
5 to 10 years before may no longer address the Warfighter’s current needs”).
54. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
55. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 10 (2011),
available at www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf
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some ideas about the way forward. The DoD must figure out how to
expedite the cyber-acquisition process. Before proceeding, however,
three qualifications are in order.
D. Three Qualifications
This paper does not maintain that the latest weaponry ensures
success in the physical or cyber domains. Technical advantage is at
most necessary;56 alone, it is not sufficient.57 But since the Battle of
Thermopylae, historians and tacticians have noted that battles often go
to the soldiers who are best equipped.58 So it will be in cyberspace.
Militaries with high-tech cyber defenses will sometimes fall prey to
inferior low-tech foes. Yet that will be the exception. Other things being
equal, superior technology will usually win.
Second, not all software that the DoD uses is bespoke. While
weapons systems require ground-up development, much of the
software the DoD uses is for more mundane purposes: payroll, human
56. Examples of lower-tech armies defeating higher-tech rivals are not unknown, such as
the Afghans repelling the Soviets. Such examples, however, are usually limited to Fabian tactics
or guerilla warfare. In pitched battle, better-equipped armies time and again have proven
devastatingly lethal. VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES
AND THE RISE TO WESTERN POWER 12–13, 19–20, 119–120 (2001) (arguing that our scientific and
cultural tradition have given Western militaries an edge for 3,000 years). Further, myth sometimes
misinterprets martial success. For example, though folklore sometimes depicts the Battle of Little
Bighorn as a triumph of Stone Age weapons over hubris and modern arms, some argue that
Custer’s famous defeat was due in part to the Sioux carrying repeating rifles and the 7th Cavalry
carrying inferior single-shot carbines. See, e.g., RICHARD ALLAN FOX, JR., ARCHEOLOGY,
HISTORY, AND CUSTER’S LAST BATTLE: THE LITTLE BIG HORN REEXAMINED 77–79 (1993).
Stories about scrappy underdogs sell more books and movie tickets, but in real life the overdogs
usually win. Having state-of-the-art weaponry is not always decisive, but it usually is.
57. Sometimes technology’s role is exaggerated. Blitzkrieg victories had less to do with
superior German military technology than with superior tactics. The British invented the tank
during World War I, and the French perfected it in the 1930s. Yet neither saw tanks as strategically
important offensive weapons. The French preferred using tanks merely as support for infantry and
artillery units. By contrast, Hitler’s success lay with the innovation of utilizing his Panzer
divisions for rapid mechanized infantry attacks. See MAX BOOT, WAR MADE NEW: TECHNOLOGY,
WARFARE, & THE COURSE OF HISTORY, 1500 TO TODAY 212–27 (2006); see also id. at 9–11
(noting that while “the tools of war do matter,” he discourages “technological determinism” and
urges that we avoid both undervaluing and overvaluing the role of technology in military history).
58. See VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR: INFANTRY BATTLE IN
CLASSICAL GREECE 55–56 (2009) (contrasting Greek armaments with the Persians who “in
warlike spirit and strength . . . were not inferior, but they were unprotected with armor”) (quoting
Herodotus 9.62.4)); Joseph Kleist, The Battle of Thermopylae: Principles of War on the Ancient
Battlefield, 6 STUDIA ANTIQUA 75, 80–81 (2008) (attributing the Spartan’s relative success despite
being vastly outnumbered in part to superior arms); Victor Davis Hanson, Hoplite Technology in
Phalanx Battle, in HOPLITES: THE CLASSICAL GREEK BATTLE EXPERIENCE 63–64 (Victor Davis
Hanson ed., 1991) (describing the “unique advantages of the hoplite shield and butt-spike to
contemporary, phalanx warfare”); F.E. ADCOCK, THE GREEK AND MACEDONIAN ART OF WAR
(1957) (explaining the significance of armor and shield technology to classical Greek infantry).
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resources, logistics, and the like. When such software is available in
the private market, the federal government should purchase it under
FAR Part 12 (“Acquisition of Commercial Items”).59 Buying
commercial is less expensive and “provides immediate access to
rapidly evolving technology.”60 Where possible, purchasing
commercial is always best. Accordingly, the agile development
methods advocated in this paper concern only the unique requirements
that cannot be met with commercial purchases. Such unique
requirements will always be a large segment of DoD outlays.61
Third, both government employees and government contractors
write software for the military. Yet because uniformed members,
civilians, and contractors are increasingly seamless in their duties,62
especially in the DoD,63 this paper will not attempt to distinguish
between them.64 Criticism of current methods and suggestions about
how they may be improved apply equally to both groups.

59. FAR 12.101(a) (establishing the policy that federal agencies are to research
“commercial” and “nondevelopmental items” to see if they meet government requirements).
60. IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH ACQUISITION, supra note 4,
at 11.
61. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry is widely credited with the commercial
revolution in defense procurement in 1990s. He recognized that DoD IT acquisition couldn’t keep
pace with commercial advances, and advocated purchasing from commercial sources whenever
possible. See, e.g., William Perry, Defense Must Open the Commercial Door, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1998, at 5 (advocating buying commercial and holding that the DoD “must give up its unique
buying practices and employ best commercial practices”); JACQUES S. GANSLER & WILLIAM
LUCYSHYN, COMMERCIAL-OFF-SHELF (COTS): DOING IT RIGHT 7–8, app. (2008) (relating the
“seminal” role of the 1994 “Perry Memo” on reshaping acquisitions to buy from commercial
sources, and including the memorandum in the appendix). The problem is that this can go only so
far. Much of what the military buys is truly unique and isn’t available commercially.
62. See Sondra Bell Nensala, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12: How HSPD12 May Limit Competition Unnecessarily and Suggestions for Reform, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 619,
661–62 (2011) (describing the government’s 251% increase in the outsourcing of IT during the
1990s); Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 350 (2004) (explaining although “Cold War agencies played a
famed role in funding cyber technologies,” in fact “the Government’s IT workforce, from the start,
has been substantially private”).
63. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY 62–64 (2008 ed.) (explaining that “many military functions,” especially in IT, “are
being transferred to civilian specialists” and “[f]or those who wish to stay at the leading edge of
military capabilities, there is a growing need for technical expertise, increasingly from private
sources”).
64. Moreover, as explained below, infra note 194, government contractors are no less
susceptible to the preference for the status quo software development method or less inclined to
suffer from the cultural or bureaucratic resistance to the adoption of agile. So embedded are
contractors in the government that they are, in fact, equally part of the problem. Accordingly, this
paper makes no distinction between government employees and government contractors.
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II. THE AGILE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT METHOD
Before coming to agile, the next three sections will recount what
came before, why that did not work, and how this led private industry
to innovate. This is more than a history lesson. Understanding the agile
method and understanding why the DoD has been a reluctant adopter
require an understanding of what agile replaced and why.
A. Pre-Agile Software Development Methods
Since the advent of the computer, there have been three stages of
software development. The first was characterized by the lack of any
formal methodology and lasted through the 1970s. During this “code
and fix” stage, programmers “wrote programs individualistically with
little or no planning.”65 This ad hoc method worked well enough at first,
but as computing power increased 10,000 fold so also did the
complexity of software design, which in turn yielded exponential
growth in the “consequences of success or failure.”66 As failing
software imposed greater costs, innovators and managers sought to
impose order and control costs using new development methods.67
The waterfall method was foremost among the new, top-down
software-development methods of the second stage. Development was
supposed follow an “orderly series of sequential stages,” Leffingwell
explains, starting with requirements and moving on to design,
implementation, testing, and deployment.68 Notably, its putative
founder warned in his first articulation of the waterfall method that it
was unsuited to the large projects to which it was later applied en

65. See Nanda C. Surendra, Using an Ethnographic Process to Conduct Requirements
Analysis for Agile Systems Development, 9 INFO. TECH. MGMT. 55 (2008).
66. DEAN LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS: LEAN REQUIREMENT
PRACTICES FOR TEAMS, PROGRAMS, AND LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS THE
ENTERPRISE 3–4 (2011).
67. Id. But see Joe Nandhakumar and David E. Avison, The Fiction of Methodological
Development: A Fields Study of Information Systems Development, 12 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE 176
(1999) (arguing that methodologies are “a necessary fiction to present an image of control or to
provide a symbolic status” and that “formal methodologies are too mechanistic to be of much use
in the detailed, day-to-day organization of developers’ activities”).
68. LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 5–6.
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masse.69 Waterfall certainly imposed order,70 but did so at the expense
of speed, price, and quality. In many ways, it was worse than what it
replaced. Stalin infamously said, “You can’t make an omelet without
breaking a few eggs.”71 Yet even Stalin would have hated waterfall:
eggs were broken, but no omelets were to be had.
Waterfall’s failures lay with some faulty assumptions. Most
fundamental among these is that requirements can be can be defined
and understood before development starts.72 In fact, requirements are
notoriously hard to pin down.73 The causes for this epistemic problem
are complicated,74 but Don Reinertsen captures well its significance.
69. Id. (citing Winston W. Royce, Managing the Development of Large Software Systems:
Concepts and Techniques, 14 WESCON Tech. Papers (1970), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (1987)); see also CRAIG
LARMAN, AGILE AND ITERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: A MANAGER’S GUIDE 105–06 (2004)
(suggesting that “few actually read Royce’s original waterfall paper” and that “its iterative flavor
was lost”); DEAN LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY: BEST PRACTICES FOR LARGE
ENTERPRISES 17–19 (2007) (explaining that Royce’s writings have been “widely
misinterpreted”).
70. See BARRY W. BOEHM, RICHARD TURNER & GRADY BOOCH, BALANCING AGILITY
AND DISCIPLINE: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (2003) (explaining the benefits of “plan-drive
methods” like waterfall are “predictability, stability, and high assurance”).
71. See Mark Edele, STALINIST SOCIETY: 1928–1953 viii (2011) (explaining that the Stalin
quote is actually an “idiomatic translation” of a phrase meaning “if you chop wood, chips will
fly”).
72. See VICTOR SZALVAY, DANUBE TECHS., INC., AN INTRODUCTION TO AGILE SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT 2 (2004), http://www.danube.com/docs/Intro_to_Agile.pdf (explaining that “one
of the biggest problems with waterfall is that it assumes that all project requirements can be
accurately gathered at the beginning of the project”); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE
AGILITY, supra note 69, at 20–26 (describing the problems with this and three other assumptions
in the waterfall model).
73. See NORTHERN ET AL., supra note 53, at 15 (explaining “the main reason for a high rate
of failure in IT development projects” is that such projects are “fraught with uncertainty and
ambiguity making it difficult to accurately define the end state up front”).
74. The fact that requirements are hard to pin down is partly due to problems with any new
technology; customers know it when they see it but seldom know what they want up front. See
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE
GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 147–63 (1997) (arguing market for new technology is unknown and
unknowable). And it is also partly due to challenges specific to software development. See
Szalvay, supra note 72, at 3 (arguing “software development is more like new product
development than manufacturing” as “building bridges relies on physical and mathematical laws”
but programming “has no clear laws or certainties on which to build”); Surendra, supra note 65
(noting that developers are enthralled with engineers’ “mechanistic view” of development process
but instead of designing “buildings and vehicles having relatively predictable requirements,
[software] developers need to construct software applications that have rapidly changing user
requirements”) (emphasis added); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at
21 (explaining the difficulty of defining requirements for intangible creations in comparison with
“mechanical and physical devices of the past”); NORTHERN ET AL. supra note 53, at 15 (explaining
that when designing an “intangible or abstract” product it is “difficult for users to define what they
want up front”). Cf. Fiction and Software, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2014, at 80–81 (reviewing Vikram
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Noting that incorrect requirements accounted for 80%–85% of project
failures,75 he says that the solution was to focus on listening to
customers in order to better define their requirements, to which he
counters:
We ignored the fact that many customers don’t know what they
want. We ignored the fact that even when they know what they want,
they can’t describe it. We ignored the fact that even when they can
describe it, they often describe a proposed solution rather than a real
need.

“The sad truth,” he concludes, “is that there is no one ‘voice of the
customer.’” There is instead “a cacophony of voices asking for different
things.”76 The effort to perfectly and completely define requirements
beforehand is a fool’s errand.77 So waterfall’s failure, in large measure,
lay with the incorrect assumption that—with enough elbow grease—
accurately forecasting requirements was possible.
Compounding this false premise is inflexibility. This likely
resulted from waterfall borrowing from manufacturing and
construction industries’ methods, where “after-the-fact changes are
costly, if not impossible.”78 Yet whatever its origin may be, this makes
waterfall doubly bad: not only does waterfall start in the wrong
direction, it fails to correct course.79 Nor was it designed to do so.
Testing is delayed until it is costly and difficult to make changes.80
Customers are rarely consulted, usually only once before and once after

Chandra’s, GEEK SUBLIME: WRITING FICTION, CODING SOFTWARE (2014), which maintains that
writing code “stands shoulder to shoulder with art” “[i]n making something out of nothing,” unlike
the world of architecture and construction, described above, which design buildings and machines
that subject to natural laws of the physical world).
75. Don Reinerstein, Foreword to LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra
note 66, at xxiii.
76. Id.
77. Some have mocked waterfall as the “requirements, delay, surprise” development
model. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 47 n.2 (emphasis added). These
“unhappy surprises” include “late-breaking negative feedback regarding design commitments
that, when learned at a late stage in the process, can be very costly to revise.” Id. at 47.
78. MARY ANN LAPHAM ET AL., CONSIDERATIONS FOR USING AGILE IN DOD ACQUISITION
6 (2010) (explaining that waterfall borrowed from these industries’ production models because
there was no other to learn from).
79. See Lowell Lindstrom & Ron Jeffries, Extreme Programming and Agile Software
Development Methodologies, 21 INFO. MGMT. SYS. 41 (2004) (describing rigidity of plan-driven
processes).
80. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 57–59 (explaining that waterfall puts off testing until
the end); LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 69, at 23–25 (explaining
that late changes are technically difficult and costly because “interdependencies have already been
built into the system”).
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development.81 And the product is released only once.82 In short,
sticking with the plan takes priority, which comes at the expense of the
flexibility necessary for a timely response to end user feedback.83
A third failing is waterfall’s overreliance on documentation. The
various steps in the sequential process can be grouped into two main
phases: analysis and coding.84 Months or years are spent on analysis to
define and document requirements. Heavy documentation connects the
two phases. Yet as Barry Boehm aptly says in his seminal article
summarizing the failures of waterfall: “a prototype is worth 100,000
words.”85 He also suggested that too much documentation can also
cause “gold plating”86 and further inflexibility.87 In sum, waterfall’s
documentation requirements impose a heavy burden on designers and
customers alike that almost certainly outweighs the benefits.
These failings and others88 made waterfall a flop. Rather than
improving on the ad hoc method, development was slower, costlier, and
of lower quality.89 Its shortcomings are well documented.90
Surprisingly, despite its faults and the introduction of new methods that
have proven to work better, waterfall is still widely used in the both
private and public sectors.91

81. See Szalvay, supra note 71, at 3 (explaining that waterfall asks that customers “specify
the entire system without having a chance to periodically see the progress and make adjustments
to the requirements as needed”).
82. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 6 (explaining that “one of the primary differences
between Waterfall and Agile is the frequency with which usable releases are produced”).
83. See LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 21–22 (arguing that
the second incorrect assumption underlying waterfall is that “change will be small and
manageable”).
84. See Royce, supra note 69.
85. Barry Boehm, Anchoring the Software Process, 13 IEEE SOFTWARE 73, 74–75 (1996)
(arguing that “written requirements specifications trying to describe the look and feel of a user
interface were nowhere near as effective as a user-interface prototype”).
86. Id. at 74 (arguing that too much documentation “encourage[s] elaborate additions”).
87. Id. (arguing that fixed requirements “produce point solutions optimized around the
original problem statement” that are inflexible and “frequently difficult to modify or to scale up”).
88. See, e.g., LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 22–26
(explaining two more incorrect assumptions of the waterfall method).
89. See William H. Roetzheim, When the Software Becomes a Nightmare: Dealing with
Failed Projects, 13 BUS. L. TODAY 42, 42–43 (2004) (describing the Standish Group’s research
in the 1990s that “provided concrete evidence of a dirty little secret the information technology
community had long suspected—software project failures were rampant and expensive”).
90. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 74–76 (summarizing four studies on waterfall’s
failures).
91. See LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 8–9
(discussing several reasons for waterfall’s persistence)
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B. The Agile Method of Software Development
Understanding why waterfall failed sets the stage for agile. Whole
books are devoted to describing and implementing agile, but its main
features can be neatly summarized in three points corresponding to the
three main problems with waterfall.
First, agile starts with a premise of epistemic modesty: we cannot
know all requirements in advance, despite our best efforts.92 Explaining
how agile corrects for waterfall in this respect, Leffingwell writes, “We
do not assume that we, or our customers, can fully understand all of the
requirements up front, or that anyone can possibly understand them all
up front.” He continues, “We do not assume that change will be small
and manageable. Rather, we assume that change will be constant[.]”93
This may seem like a small difference, but it underpins all that makes
agile work so effectively.
Second, agile is above all flexible. It accomplishes this using an
iterative process whereby simple versions of the software are delivered
early and often.94 Each iteration includes a compressed version of the
various waterfall phases (e.g., design, testing, and feedback),95 and this
cycle is repeated over and over. Mary and Tom Poppendieck describe
this iterative process:
An iteration is a useful increment of software that is designed,
programmed, tested, integrated, and delivered during a short, fixed
timeframe. It is very similar to a prototype in product development
except that an iteration produces a working portion of the final
product. This software will be improved in future iterations, but it is
a working, tested, integrated code from the beginning.96

They explain the significance of this: “Iterations provide a dramatic
increase in feedback over sequential software development, thus
providing much broader communication” among customers,
developers, and other stakeholders.”97 Agile assumes imperfect
92. Richard K. Cheng, On Being Agile, NEXTGOV (Sept. 23, 2010),
http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2010/09/on-being-agile/47627/ (saying agile is “adaptive”
rather than “predictive”).
93. LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 26 (emphasis original).
94. See MARY POPPENDIECK & TOM POPPENDIECK, LEAN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT: AN
AGILE TOOLKIT 27–34 (2003) (explaining that using discrete iterations helps identify “quality
problems as soon as they occur”); LARMAN, supra note 69, at 9–11; LEFFINGWELL, SCALING
SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 54 (saying that iterative development eliminates waterfall’s
attempt to “build it right the first time”); LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 5–6 (explaining the
process of focusing efforts by selecting stories from the queue).
95. See Szalvay, supra note 71, at 4.
96. POPPENDIECK & POPPENDIECK, supra note 94, at 28.
97. Id.
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communication, but constant feedback helps bridge the gap, so that
designers eventually come to understand and to provide what the
customer actually wants. Agile succeeds so remarkably precisely
because multiple failures are expected; designers are expected to fail
early and often. Unlike waterfall, “[t]esters are involved from the first
iteration” and “[d]esign problems are exposed early,” and “changetolerance is built into the system.”98 This is, Leffingwell writes, “the
heartbeat of agility.”99
Third, agile dumps waterfall’s documentation requirements.100
Instead of such documentation, resources are redirected to developing
working prototypes for customers to tinker with—and, again, such “a
prototype is worth 100,000 words.”101 Boehm says that “written
requirements specifications trying to describe the look and feel of a user
interface [are] nowhere near as effective as a user-interface prototype.”
So the developer’s and customer’s time is better spent; it is hard—or at
least requires a great deal of imagination—to discuss meaningfully how
to improve software that does not yet exist. But agile gives customers
software they can see, use, and then provide immediate feedback on.
Before proceeding, it seems worth mentioning that agile is more
than the latest management-speak patois or business-school gimmick.
Some claim that its roots date back to Roman times.102 It is unclear how
tenable that classical pedigree is, and ascertaining agile's genealogy is
beyond the scope of this paper. But agile does tap into some basic
insights of free-market economics. Its bottom-up approach works for
the same reason the free market’s “invisible hand” outperforms central
planners.103 Were accurate forecasting possible, waterfall probably
98. Id.
99. LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 155–69.
100. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 326–27 (describing agile documentation methods that
reduces preparation time from months or years to hours); LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 284 (saying traditional documentation-heavy requirements are
“eliminated, reduced in scope, or replaced by lightweight substitutes”); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING
SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 215–17 (explaining that whereas extensive documentation
was “part and parcel of the waterfall model itself,” “in agile these documents do not exist”).
101. Boehm, supra note 85, at 74–75.
102. See Reagan & Rico, supra note 52, at 50 (claiming agile has roots in Roman legion
tactics and experimental techniques used by Leonardo, Newton, Pasteur, and Edison).
103. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 35 (R.H. Campbell & R.H. Skinner, eds., 1976) (1776) (first coining the image of the
“invisible hand”); see also TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS 19–25
(1989) (summarizing Smith’s “invisible hand” whereby society benefits from each man pursuing
his own interests). Incidentally, it is no accident that agile and similar innovations emerged from
where they did as “[i]f there is an industry that exemplifies the virtues of the private sector, it is
technology.” Companies and the State, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT), Feb. 22, 2014, at 12.
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would work. Alas, it is not. Therein lies the epistemic problem. Agile
takes a more modest approach and avoids that problem, not pretending
to know in advance what customers need or want. Instead, it listens,
adapts, experiments, and then listens some more. In this way it defers
to the wisdom of the masses, and thereby resembles the operation of
free markets. Agile is more than a passing fad.
C. Agile’s Proven Success
Agile development is not without critics.104 Nor is there a single
method applied uniformly across the field; schisms and heterodoxies
abound.105 This paper does not advocate for any particular sect. Rather,
it considers how agile—in a general or ecumenical form— compares
with waterfall, and finds that agile has a much better record of success.
Not only does anecdotal evidence suggest that agile works in the
private sector, empirical evidence confirms this.106 For example, a 2004
study by the Standish Group showed that the use of agile cut failure104. See, e.g., LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78 at 49–51 (discussing six common objections
to agile, especially as applied to the DoD).
105. See LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 10–29
(describing agile’s various forms including iterative/incremental, dynamic systems development
method, adaptive software development, extreme programming, open unified process, scrum,
lean, crystal methods, and Kanban).
106. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 63–109 (providing what Szalvay, supra note 72, at 10,
calls “the most comprehensive empirical evidence for Agile/Iterative of any book currently on the
market,” and what LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY, supra note 69, at 19, calls the
best source for “solid, statistical evidence of how [waterfall] fails us again and again”) (citing,
e.g., Alan D. McCormack, Product Development Processes that Work, 42 MIT SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 75 (2001) (two-year study by Harvard business professors finding iterative “approach to
software development results in speedier process and higher-quality products”); Alan D.
MacCormack et al., Exploring the Trade-offs Between Productivity & Quality in the Selection of
Software Development Practices, 20 IEEE SOFTWARE 78 (2003) (describing results of a followup study showing 50% of variation in productivity resulted from two iterative practices—releasing
a partial product with lower functionality and daily builds with regression testing); Neil B.
Harrison & James O. Complien, Patterns of Productive Software Organizations, BELL LABS
TECH. J. 140 (1996) (finding a consistent pattern of highly successful software projects where
iterative methods were used); David Cohen, Gary Larson & Bill Ware, Improving Software
Investments Through Requirements Validation, IEEE 26TH SOFTWARE ENGINEERING WORKSHOP
106 (2001) (summarizing study of 400 projects spanning 15 years showing “software pollution”
rate was significantly reduced by adopting iterative processes); SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, AGILE
METHODOLOGIES SURVEY RESULTS (2003) (describing survey results about agile showing that
88% believed it improved productivity, 84% improved quality); STANDISH GROUP INT’L, CHAOS
MANIFESTO 2013, at 5 (2013), http://versionone.com/assets/img/files/ChaosManifesto2013.pdf.
(illustrating value of iterative practices following study of 23,000 projects); Andrew Thomas, IT
Projects Sink or Swim, BRIT. COMPUTER SCI. REV. (2001) (summarizing study of 1,000 UK
projects showing 90% of successful projects lasted less than twelve months, and 47% less than
six); CAPERS JONES, PATTERNS OF SOFTWARE SYSTEMS FAILURE AND SUCCESS (1996) (large
sample study showing that the larger the project, the more likely it will fail)).
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rates in half.107 Their latest report partly attributes increasing successrates from 29% to 39% from 2004 to 2013 to using agile.108 Another
study claims agile decreased costs by up to 61%, cut delivery time by
up to 58%, and reduced defects by up to 81%.109
These numbers suggest that if the federal government could
successfully implement agile, not only would software quality and
delivery times improve, billions in savings would accrue—and not only
in the DoD.110 Critics may object that agile is impossible for the
government to implement. In fact, the federal government was a
pioneer in iterative software-development methods from 1950s through
the 1970s,111 and there is no reason to think the federal government
could not learn to be agile again.112 Remarkable savings, better value,
and faster delivery are within the government’s reach.
III. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL SOFTWARE PROCUREMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT
The previous section detailed the history of the waterfall and agile
software-development methods. This section starts with a broad
overview the federal government’s IT-procurement practices and
reforms since the 1960s. Then it describes the government’s pioneering
efforts with iterative software development (a precursor to agile), its
adoption of waterfall and the disastrous consequences that resulted, and
finally its long history with agile. This background is necessary to
understanding why the federal government, despite the rhetoric about
agile methods, is still stuck in the past.

107. Szalvay, supra note 72, at 10 (citing STANDISH GROUP INT’L, CHAOS CHRONICLES
(2004) (indicating agile reduced failure rates from 31% to 15%)).
108. See CHAOS MANIFESTO 2013, supra note 106.
109. See LAPHAM ET AL. (2010), supra note 78, at 36 (citing Jim Highsmith, Beyond Scope,
Schedule, and Cost: Measuring Agile Performance, Agile Development Conference, Orlando,
Florida, 2009)).
110. Perhaps other agencies will require bespoke software less frequently than the DoD;
however, to the extent they need software tailored to meet unique needs that are not otherwise
supplied in the private market, agile is no less applicable to them and might save additional
billions. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 125–132 and accompanying text.
112. Some have argued that agile only works for smaller organizations or smaller projects.
Leffingfwell’s entire book, supra note 69, is devoted to arguing that agile can work on a larger
scale and for large enterprises. The federal government and the DoD should be no exception.
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A. An Overview of IT Procurement Policy Since the 1960s
From the 1965 until 1996, the General Services Administration
exercised central control over IT purchases.113 With the Clinger–Cohen
Act’s repeal of the Brooks Act,114 IT purchasing reverted to individual
agencies,115 and IT- and non-IT processes were thereby merged because
it was thought that having separate processes was too “cumbersome
and slow.”116 Since then, IT purchases, both hardware and software,117
are done using “normal procurement procedures following a few
special rules in FAR 39.”118
While agencies have purchasing authority, the Office of
Management and Budget still has responsibility over standards and
policy.119 Congress has also established a number of requirements: that
agencies have a Chief Information Officer,120 follow planning
requirements,121 and use modular contracts.122 It has also required
OMB to promote various contract-management programs.123
B. The Federal Government’s Experience with Iterative,
Waterfall, and Agile Software Development Methods
Some may suppose the government cannot do agile either because
of its size or to inherent limitations on the public sector’s efficiency or

113. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1995); see also John, supra note 47, at 4, 7–8 (describing the United
States’ failed experiment with consolidated IT from the mid-1960s until 1994).
114. Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, div.
E, tit. LI, § 5101, 110 Stat. 186, 680 (1996) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 11302).
115. 40 U.S.C. § 11314 (2013).
116. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 28.
117. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2014).
118. JOHN CIBINIC, JR., RALPH C. NASH & CHRISTOPHER R. YUKINS, FORMATION OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1104 (4th ed. 2011). (referencing 48 C.F.R. pt. 39).
119. Id. at 1104–05 (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h); 40 U.S.C. § 11302(b); OMB Circular A130, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a130_a130trans4).
120. 40 U.S.C. § 11315 (2013).
121. Id. § 11312(b); see also OMB Circular A-130, supra note 119, at ¶ 8.b(4); 48 C.F.R. §
39.102 (2014) (establishing that agencies should consider “risks, benefits, and costs” of IT).
122. 41 U.S.C. § 2308 (2013) (mandating modular systems); see also CIBINIC ET AL., supra
note 118, at 1108–09 (explaining that modular contracts are “successive acquisitions of
interoperable increments”). But see Acquisition White Paper on Modular Contracting (Jul. 26,
1997) (GSA’s warning about risks of modular contracting because modules may not be fully
compatible).
123. See 40 U.S.C. § 11303 (requiring OMB to encourage performance- and results-based
management for agency IT purchases); § 11302(b) (promotion of acquisition and capital planning
processes); § 11312 (detailing capital planning and investment control); § 11313 (describing
performance- and results-based management); see also OMB Circular A-130, supra note 119, at
¶ 8.b(1) (implementing these policies).
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competency.124 In fact, not only is the government capable of using
agile, it was a pioneer in the use of iterative and incremental methods
that were the precursors to agile. For example, for several decades
starting in the 1950s, the DoD used these methods to develop software
for weapons systems including the Army’s artillery command-andcontrol system,125 the Navy’s Trident submarine,126 and LAMPS
helicopter-ship system,127 and the Air Force’s air defense system.128
The DoD was not alone. NASA used such methods for the Project
Mercury, the first manned spaceflight program,129 and for the space
shuttle.130
These were not exceptions. Larman explains that IBM’s Federal
Services Division and its rival developer, TRW, frequently used
incremental methods in the 1970s and that their use was “a well-known
practice.”131 Finally, the use of iterative engineering methods was not
limited only to software development. For example, the Air Force
utilized lean or agile manufacturing methods “to usher in the jet age
and to rapidly evolve experimental aircraft such as X-15, SR-71, U-2,
F-111, F-117, and many others.”132 Such methods are considered close
cousins, if not parents, to agile software-development methods.133
124. See supra note 112.
125. Doris Tamanaha, An Integrated Rapid Prototyping Methodology for Command and
Control Systems, 7 ACM SIGSOFT SOFTWARE ENGINEERING NOTES 169 (1982) (describing
Army project using iterative methods for designing software for artillery command and control in
1984–88)).
126. Don O’Neil, J. OF SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 77 (1983) (relating the use of iterative
software methods for development of the Trident submarine in 1972).
127. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 83–84 (describing a four-year, 200 person project with
millions of lines of code that whose every delivery “was on time and under budget”).
128. See Carolyn Wong, A Successful Software Development, 10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 714–27 (1984) (describing the use of iterative methods to develop the
air defense system in 1977–80 and their initial problems with developing complex software using
waterfall).
129. See LARMAN, supra note 69, at 79–81 (citing Craig Larman & Victor Basili, Iterative
and Incremental Development: A Brief History, 36 COMPUTER 47 (2003) (describing incremental
software methods used in Project Mercury in the 1950s)).
130. William A Madden & Kyle Y. Rone, Design, Development, Integration: Space Shuttle
Primary Flight Software System, 27 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 14 (1984) (describing
NASA’s use of iterative approach for space shuttle’s flight software system in 1977–80 as
waterfall method was unsuitable given the frequently changing requirements of such a complex
system).
131. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 82–84 (describing TRW’s work on the Army’s ballistic
missile defense system in the 1970s) (citing R.D. Williams, Managing the Development of
Reliable Software, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RELIABLE
SOFTWARE (1975)).
132. Id. at 51.
133. Id.
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For reasons that remain unclear, the DoD mandated use of
waterfall methods in the 1980s.134 Efficiency suffered.135 The
implementation under DoD-STD-2167 provide a striking case study of
waterfall’s shortcomings: “Out of a total cost of $37 billion for the
sample set, 75% of the projects failed or were never used, and only 2%
were used without extensive modification.”136 “DoD planners came to
believe that the key to successful weapon systems was to apply rigid
manufacturing principles to acquisition and systems engineering.”137
Thus, a series of tightly controlled procurement regulations was
instituted, which lasted until the mid-1990s.138 This was typical of a
government that had lost its way and had forgotten about the virtue of
iterative development methods139—to the detriment of end-users and
the public fisc.140
For much of the 1980s, waterfall was mandatory for the DoD’s
software development and procurement.141 Later in the decade,
following the “stultifying influence” of waterfall on large IT projects,
those requirements were lifted and a new standard adopted to allow for
use of iterative and incremental methods.142 Despite this, the regulation
134. For a possible explanation, see infra note 137.
135. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 76 (citing R. Solon, Benchmarking the ROI from Software
Process Improvement, 5 DOD SOFTWARE TECH. NEWS 6 (2002) (study of 43,700 projects showed
not only that agile was more efficient than lean but that only “loosely” applying waterfall method
caused significant productivity improvements)).
136. Id. at 87 (citing Lt Col (ret.) Joe Jarzombek, The 5th Annual JAWS S3 Proceedings
(1999)).
137. Reagan & Rico, supra note 52, at 51. It would be an interesting historical or
sociological question to consider whether the adoption of top-down controls was considered
necessary following the Sputnik scare in 1957. We now know that Soviet Union would later
collapse in part because it could not keep up with the rapid growth in Western technology. So it
seems strange in hindsight that we might have adopted authoritarian methods to expedite defense
acquisition and technological development. Yet that strangeness is anachronistic. At the time it
might have seemed that top-down controls were necessary in order to keep up with our Cold War
rival, which was unfettered by free-market economics and, thus, winning the space race. See, e.g.,
PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY 223–24 (2011) (describing the clamor
for radical changes to U.S. policy in order to keep up with Russian technology).
138. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 87 (citing four DoD regulations and explaining that “these
were only the tip of an iceberg of thousands of lower-level standards making up . . . the defense
acquisition system”).
139. See id. at 85–87 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF FAA’S AUTOMATION PROGRAM, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-85 (1998)
(describing the FAA’s disastrous efforts to design a new air traffic control system using the
waterfall method resulting in $2.6 billion spent and nothing to show for it)).
140. Larman explains that prior to waterfall, iterative and ad hoc methods coexisted. See id.
at 102 (explaining that iterative was a “contemporary alternative” with ad hoc).
141. Id. at 87 (citing DOD-STD-2167).
142. Id. at 88–89 (adopting DOD-STD-2167 in February 1988).
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“contain[ed] an implied preference for the waterfall model, due to its
document-driven milestones approach.”143
After years of failure with waterfall, a 1994 study recommended
iterative methods.144 Soon after, a regulation was introduced removing
any bias favoring waterfall.145 Six years later, a new instruction was
introduced, which again recommended iterative methods.146
In 2003, the DoD implemented a “multiple milestone” process
that introduced more flexibility into acquisition processes.147
Dissatisfaction with this process led to further revisions in 2007 and
2008148 to what are commonly called the DoD 5000 series. Though
these regulations both mentioned and recommended agile-like
methods,149 they were still blamed for insufficiently clearing the path
for agile reforms.150
In March 2009, the Defense Science Board found the conventional
procurement system was “inadequate” for cyber acquisitions because
of the “short half-life” of commercial IT.151 This report encouraged
further agile reforms in Congress.152 On October 9, 2009, President
Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of
2010,153 which mandated agile procurement methods.154 Thirteen
months later, the DoD’s report to Congress again promised its recent
reforms would “enable DoD information capability projects to take
advantage of the benefits of agile development methods[.]”155 Congress
143. Id. at 89.
144. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 89–90 (citing REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
TASK FORCE ON ACQUIRING DEFENSE SOFTWARE COMMERCIALLY (1994)).
145. Id. at 90 (citing MIL-STD-498 (Dec. 1994) (establishing uniform requirements for
software documentation and development)).
146. Id. (referencing DoDI 5000.2).
147. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 29–30.
148. Id. at 30–32.
149. See DoDD 5000.01, § 4.3.2 (replacing “spiral” from the previous version with
“incremental” as the “preferred” development method for advanced technology); DODI 5000.02,
Enclosure 2, ¶ 5.a (describing the technology development phase as “iterative”).
150. See, e.g., LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 12–13 (noting a “strong belief that is
prevalent across the DoD community” is that the DoD 5000 series is “rigid in requiring a
traditional Waterfall process for the development of software”).
151. Id. at ix.
152. See id. at 42–45 (citing several studies since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986
stressing the need for acquisitions reform).
153. See Cheng, supra note 92.
154. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 11184, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
155. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, A NEW APPROACH FOR DELIVERING
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 12 (2012) (report to
Congress pursuant to Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010).
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considered yet another IT reform bill in 2013: the Federal Information
Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). It was originally an
independent bill, was added to the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) of 2014, and was finally removed for additional
consideration.156
The DoD has taken clandestine efforts toward rapid cyber
procurement, but secrecy makes it hard to appraise their efficacy.157 If
the past is any guide, the results may be underwhelming. For some time
the DoD has spoken the language of agile158 without actually doing or
being agile. Though words like “agile” and “lean” may dominate DoD
press releases about improving cyber-procurement methods, there is
little show for this rhetorical flourish, at least not at the DoD-wide
level.
Although the DoD as a whole has yet to fully implement its agile
ideals, some individual services have taken steps in that direction. For
example, on November 28, 2005, the Secretary of the Air Force signed
a memo directing the use of lean methods,159 and his successor signed
an acquisition improvement plan on May 4, 2009, which also featured

156. FITARA was originally H.R. 1232, but on June 14, 2013 the House approved adding it
as an amendment to the NDAA of 2014. David Perera, House Approves FITARA Version as Part
(June
17,
2013),
of
National
Defense
Bill,
FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/house-approves-fitara-version-part-national-defensebill/2013-06-17; Dietrich Knauth, Congress Prepares Last-Ditch Attempt At Defense Policy Bill,
LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/494217/congress-prepares-last-ditch
-attempt-at-defense-policy-bill (explaining other aspects of the NDAA held up its passage and it
appears that lawmakers will reach an agreement before the bill expires). Ultimately, Congress
removed FITARA from the 2014 NDAA, and postponed its consideration. Dietrich Knauth,
Government Contracts Regulation And Legislation To Watch in 2014, LAW360 (Jan. 1, 2014)
(explaining that the delay was caused in part by worries about the rollout of Heathcare.gov and a
consensus that “the way the government buys technology is too slow, too burdened by
inefficiencies and too prone to high-profile failures”).
157. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon to Fast-Track Cyberweapons Acquisition, WASH.
POST (Apr. 9, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-09/world/35453841_1_weapon
-systems-pentagon-technology-and-logistics (reporting on this development from an undisclosed
16-page Pentagon report describing a new rapid cyber procurement program).
158. “Agile” has become a popular word in defense circles, and has lost currency with
repetition. See, e.g., QUADRENNIAL, supra note 28, at 1, 73, 81, 103 (using “agile” four times);
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN FY 2012–FY 2013, at 2, 6, 12, 24, 37
(using “agile” seven times and describing two of its seven goals using that adjective); DEFENSE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY STRATEGIC PLAN: 2013–2018, at 2, 4–5, 10, 14 (2013) (using
“agile” six times).
159. See LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66 (equating lean
and agile); Information Technology Lean Process Streamlines Acquisition, U.S. FED. NEWS (Jan.
23, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 2114017 (reporting that Secretary Michael Wynne signed a
memo directing use of lean acquisition methods).
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agile methods.160 Such initiatives have proven more than empty slogans
and have led to pockets of success.161 Lapham cites the Air Force’s
FIST program and recommend duplicating its success with smaller
teams.162 The Air Force’s Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom
AFB, Massachusetts announced it had started to develop capabilities in
order to “to fill technology gaps within hours or weeks.”163 And the
Army is fielding a new agile system for its communications-networks
acquisitions.164
Unfortunately, although the authority to use iterative methods has
been available for nearly two decades,165 the programs listed in the last
paragraph are exceptions. To date, agile reforms have been meager.166
This should come as no surprise because companies and cultures
“emphasiz[ing] hierarchical management and control, and detailed
predictive planning [are] the slowest adopters” of agile, and few
institutions are more hierarchical than the DoD.167 The next section
considers such cultural impediments and other reasons agile has not
taken root and makes suggestions for improvement.

160. AIR FORCE ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT PLAN 6 (2009) (favoring an “incremental
acquisition strategy” whereby “early, if only partial, operational capabilit[ies] [are] pursued rather
than strategies that deliver the 100% solution[s]” that are too costly, late, or risky).
161. See, e.g., LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 2 (describing interviews with successful agile
programs used in preparing report: “Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), Single Integrated Air
Picture (SIAP), Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), Virtual Mission Operations Center
(VMOC), Space Radar, an Army tank program, and some other classified programs”).
162. Id. at 43.
163. See Brewin, supra note 52. ESC has since been reorganized under the Air Force
Material Command’s new Life Cycle Management Center (LCMC). See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-366, AIR FORCE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS CENTER (2013)
(detailing the reorganization of Hanscom AFB’s under LCMC).
164. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-179, ARMY NETWORK: SIZE AND
SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION INVESTMENT MERIT INCREASED OVERSIGHT (2013).
165. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Porche et al., supra note 53, at xiv (acknowledging that agile reforms will not
be easy for the Navy); Reagan & Rico, supra note 52, at 52 (arguing iterative methods are here to
stay, but “there is a long way to go” in terms of implementing such reforms); Air Force Materiel
Command Building Acquisition Plan For Cyber Purchases, 20 INSIDE THE AIR FORCE (Dec. 18,
2009), available at 2009 WLNR 25490253 (AFMC commander acknowledging that the Air Force
had not figured out how to do agile cyber procurement); Teri Takai, DoD CIO’s 10-Point Plan for
IT Modernization (2012) (urging agile acquisitions reforms), http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals
/0/Documents/ITMod/CIO%2010%20Point%20Plan%20for%20IT%20Modernization.pdf.
167. LARMAN, supra note 69, at 87.
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTING AGILE IN THE DOD AND HOW TO FIX
THEM
This closing section first demonstrates that DoD software
development still uses the waterfall. Despite numerous initiatives and
much rhetoric, agile has not been widely adopted. It then presents
studies showing that laws or regulations are not the primary reason.
This is mainly a function of culture. It offers suggestions for changing
the culture. It closes with some laws and regulations that could be
amended to more fully promote agile reform.
A. DoD Software Development Still Resembles The Waterfall
Method
Notwithstanding recent changes in the laws and regulations
governing acquisitions supposedly implementing agile, the DoD is still
doing waterfall. For simplicity, this section will focus on the same three
shortcomings listed above to illustrate how much the DoD still uses
waterfall: a faulty assumption about what can be known beforehand
about requirements; inflexibility after coding has begun; and onerous
documentation requirements.
First, though the DoD purports to be agile, it relies on lengthy upfront analysis to define requirements. “Current DoD processes,” the
National Research Council explains, “put great emphasis on detailing
requirements before a program is approved to start,” that results in
“years of requirements development” and in turn leads to “the delivery
of IT systems that are trying to meet requirements that have long since
changed or are continuing to shift.”168
Two examples illustrate the tendency to ignore or misunderstand
the application of agile to DoD IT acquisition. One is the Air Force’s
Acquisition Improvement Plan. Though praised above for promoting
agile,169 this plan also displays a certain cognitive dissonance. It uses
some agile jargon,170 yet on closer inspection its wording and guidance
168. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 41; id. at 85 (recommending that
“big-R” replace “small-R” requirements, meaning that “high-level descriptions that are expected
to be fairly stable” replace “more detailed requirements” that “evolve” as development
progresses).
169. See AIR FORCE ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT PLAN, supra note 160.
170. Compare id. (“warfighters must resist the temptation to pursue high risk requirements
that are too costly and take too long to deliver in favor of an incremental acquisition strategy” and
favoring “incremental strategies that deliver early, if only partial, capabilities”) with 1 (implying
that requirement can be forecasted by faulting the current system for “requirements continu[ing]
to creep well beyond their initial scope), 2 (citing a study faulting the Air Force for having
“unstable requirements” implying that requirements can be predicted and controlled), 5–6
(discussing requirements generation and in addition to the agile-friendly language quoted above
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sound more like waterfall. To be fair, this is complicated by the fact
that this document refers to defense acquisition generally and not only
to IT acquisition.171 Yet there is still a glaring inconsistency.
The other is the DoD’s report to Congress in response to Section
804 of the NDAA of 2010172 mandating agile IT acquisition. Though it
uses words like “agile” or “iterative” repeatedly,173 devotes 61 pages to
planning for agile,174 and starts strong on requirements development,175
it quickly becomes clear that the requirements process is not agile,
iterative, or simple. One is soon lost in a sea of acronyms and
abbreviations for the various steps.176 Earlier the report failed to
conceal its pining for the waterfall metrics of yore, listing among its
accomplishments “well-scoped and well-defined requirements.”177
Either the authors did not recognize the inconsistency178 or they are

making several recommendations more in keeping with waterfall, e.g., saying requirements
generation must occur “early” and be a cross-functional endeavor, implying this is a lengthy
process balancing several competing objectives), 7 (mandating that requirements be “finite,
measurable, [and] prioritized,” again taking as given that creating such a list of requirements is
desirable), and 7 (“freez[ing] program requirements at contract award,” once again making the
assumption that requirements can be forecasted).
171. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–41 (conceding that the
DoD’s caution and “emphasis on detailing requirements before a program is approved to start”
might make sense for major weapons systems, but arguing that is unsuitable to IT acquisitions).
172. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 804, 123 Stat. 2190, 2402–03
(2009) (“Implementation of New Acquisition Process for Information Technology Systems”).
173. See A NEW APPROACH FOR DELIVERING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES IN
THE DOD, supra note 155, at 7, 9, 12 (using “agile” three times); id. at 2, 4, 8–10, 17 (using
“iterative” six times).
174. See, e.g., id. at 12 (assuring Congress that new common infrastructure will enable the
DoD “to take advantage of the benefits of agile development methods”).
175. Id. at 14–15 (noting new process “will need to acknowledge the uncertainty associated
with the dynamic IT environment and incorporate the flexibility”).
176. “Initial requirements will be defined at the mission level[.]” Id. at 15. In addition to a
half dozen other requirements, these broad requirement definitions will include “key performance
parameters approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)[.]” Id. Processes will
differ by area, but “all processes will include business process reengineering and an
implementation management plan describing all DOTMLPF actions necessary to prepare the user
community before receiving the IT capability.” Id. Requirements must also be run through the
“JCIDS process to streamline requirements.” Id. DoD business software must also be run through
the Business Capability Lifecycle (BCL). Id. at 16. Several changes are specifically mandated in
Section 804. For example, instead of “traditional acquisition project milestones,” under the new
reforms these will be replaced by “in-process reviews by integrated governance councils with
decision authority[.]” Id. In short, this is still a very complicated requirements development
process more akin to the waterfall than to the agile method it espouses.
177. Id. at 4.
178. That is, if requirements can be accurately “scoped” or “defined” then why use agile?
The inability to perfectly requirements is what makes agile necessary in the first place.
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passive–aggressive, using the agile terminology but atavistically
clinging to waterfall practices.179
Second, studies suggest the DoD is still locked into a rigid process
that is inflexible once coding has started.180 Anecdotal evidence also
suggests this is the case, given top officials quoted above on continuing
problems with slow cyber procurement.181
Third, the DoD still requires reams of documentation. Contractors
who are familiar with agile and then work with the DoD complain that
the DoD wants to have its cake and eat it, too.182 It calls itself agile but
uses the paperwork that was the hallmark of waterfall; it’s business as
usual. Documentation “generated for agile is tailored to meet the
minimum required” by developers, whereas “the DoD still rel[ies]
heavily upon milestone reviews,183 documents, reports, and selected
metrics.”184 Over-documentation reflects the false premise about
requirements; much effort goes into “granular” estimates and forecasts
for the Integrated Master Schedule.185 Program managers also demand
the “full complement” of documentation to show progress.186 Thus, a
common complaint among contractors is that the government has not

179. Lapham suggests a third option. Organizations undergoing transformational change
that comes with adopting a new business model often go through a period where their “espoused
values” fail to align with “basic assumptions.” LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 18–19 (citing EDGAR
H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (1992)). Perhaps this is not only a more
charitable explanation but also more accurate.
180. Mary Lapham, DoD Agile Adoption: Necessary Considerations, Concerns, and
Changes, CROSSTALK 31 (Jan. 2012), http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-archives
/2012/201201/201201-Lapham.pdf (summarizing a Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) study and describing some cultural barriers to full implementation of agile in the
DoD); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-681, EFFECTIVE PRACTICES AND
FEDERAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING AGILE METHODS (2012) (explaining various obstacles in
shifting from waterfall to more flexible agile methods); LAPHAM, supra 53, at 14 (explaining that
adopting agile processes to replace waterfall will require substantial cultural change within the
DoD).
181. See generally supra note 52 (quoting a half dozen commentators and officials on how
slow DoD IT acquisition process is); see also Clark, supra note 46 (top cyber commander saying
“he wanted to buy ‘faster, better, quicker’ since the cyber realm doesn’t really allow for the seven
to 10 years a standard acquisition program usually takes.”); INSIDE THE AIR FORCE, supra note
166 (Air Force general officer acknowledging that Air Force still has not figured out how to do
rapid cyber procurement).
182. But see infra note 194.
183. Agile proponents mock such documentation, which agile methods render superfluous,
as “high ritual” or “high ceremony.” See LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 37 (citing ALISTAIR
COCKBURN, AGILE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT: THE COOPERATIVE GAME (2006 2d ed.)).
184. William Broadus, The Challenges of Being Agile, DEF. AT&L 5, 8 (Jan. 2013).
185. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 17.
186. Id. at 18.
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adjusted its documentation requirements to correspond to supposedly
agile methods.187
As described above, agile addresses each of these three
shortcomings. Were it applied in substance as well as in name, the DoD
would profit from lower prices, timelier delivery, and better products.
So what is keeping the DoD from doing agile? The next section tries to
answer that question.
B. Federal Law or Regulations Do Not Preclude Agile; Instead,
Culture and Bureaucratic Inertia Impede Change
After several decades of IT-acquisition reforms one thing is clear.
The problem is not laws or regulations that favor waterfall or disfavor
agile. Agile has been an option under the rules for nearly two
decades.188 Several studies have found that the current set of
procurement laws and regulations are not incompatible with agile.189
Though perhaps not tailored as well as they could be, which the next
section considers, that is not the main problem.
The main problem, instead, lies with the culture.190 As Lapham
writes, “Agile culture runs counter to the traditional DoD acquisition
culture in many ways.”191 This section considers four reasons why the
DoD culture favors waterfall: a preference for familiar hierarchical
control, risk aversion, and ignorance of the legal authority permitting

187. Id. at 40–41. But see infra note 194.
188. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
189. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 42 (saying that while many in the acquisition community
fear that agile is forbidden, “we do not know of any regulations that expressly preclude or limit
the use of Agile”); LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 12–13 (noting that although there is a
widespread belief that the DoD 5000 series forbid agile “programs that have used Agile in
software development have found that the DoD 5000 series has great flexibility and does not in
fact preclude the use of Agile”); Broadus, supra note 184, at 6 (citing “multiple studies” indicating
that “there are no direct policy or practice issues that would preclude or limit the use of Agile
methods within the DoD”); NORTHERN ET AL., supra note 53, at 24 (citing Duquette, Bloom, &
Crawford, Transitioning Agile/Rapid Acquisition initiatives to the Warfighter, The MITRE
Corporation, Technical Report WN080041 (2008) (unpublished) (citing specific provisions from
the FAR and explaining how they support agile contracting, specifically §§ 6.3, 16.207, 16.5,
16.603, 43.2).
190. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–42 (describing “cultural
impediments take precedence over rapid [software] development”); STAFF OF. S. SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG.,
REP. ON THE AIR FORCE’S EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM: A CAUTIONARY TALE ON
THE NEED FOR BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING AND COMPLYING WITH ACQUISITION BEST
PRACTICES 1–2, 8, 18–20 (Jul. 7, 2014) (attributing the failed development of logistics software
to “resist[ing] institutional changes necessary for success” and “cultural resistance to change”).
191. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 21.
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agile methods.192 Before proceeding, it bears mentioning that cultural
issues are not unique to the military; recognizing the corporate culture
is increasingly recognized by business scholars as an important part of
what executives do, and can help them to benefit from and, where
necessary, change or compensate for that culture.193
First, maybe senior procurement personnel have resisted agile
since they grew up with and are comfortable with waterfall.194 After all,
waterfall was not only preferred in the 1980s, it was required.195 Thus,
Lapham describes a culture both “heavily invested” in waterfall and
“skeptical” about agile,196 and attributes this to comfort with the status
quo.197 It bears mentioning that the DoD is not unique in this respect;
agile acolytes have long evangelized that it is not enough to do agile,
but that organizations must develop an agile culture.198
The tendency to treat software development like any other large
weapons-systems procurement is a kindred problem. As the National
Research Council explains, “DOD systems acquisition policies,
192. These are not the only reasons that the DoD acquisition community prefers the status
quo and disfavors agile. There are several other reasons. See, e.g., LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78,
at 49–51 (listing six common complaints about agile methods among DoD contracting
professionals including that it is new, risky, and difficult to adopt); LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 18–
22 (identifying the DoD’s general cultural resistance to agile methods). And in addition to cultural
resistance to agile, the workforce has several other shortcomings. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 42–43 (listing several such problems, including “personnel practices
that are common in the acquisition community” such as “rotating personnel too often” for program
managers to see a project through to completion).
193. See Learning the Lingo, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2014, at 72–73 (reviewing a new book
on the subject, JOHN CHILDRESS, LEVERAGE: THE CEO’S GUIDE CORPORATE CULTURE (2013));
Crossing the Divide, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013, at 99–100 (reviewing a book on how national
cultures affect corporate cultures, KAI HAMMERICH & RICHARD LEWIS, FISH CAN’T SEE WATER,
HOW NATIONAL CULTURES CAN MAKE OR BREAK YOUR CORPORATE STRATEGY (2013)).
194. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 14. Lapham also explains that DoD acquisition personnel
are not alone in this regard. She writes, “long-time DoD contractors” are likewise “more
comfortable with Waterfall and skeptical about using Agile.” LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at
12.
195. See supra note 134.
196. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 43.
197. Id. (writing that “culture of the DoD acquisition community . . . is comfortable with
Waterfall and skeptical about the use of Agile”) (emphasis added).
198. See, e.g., LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 1–2, 13–15 (describing the so-called “Agile
Manifesto” and the challenges of not just “doing” agile but also “being” agile, i.e., developing an
agile culture); LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 43 (relating that a frequent topics at the 2009
Agile Development Practices Conference was culture and that the that agile “d[oes] not succeed
if an organization’s culture d[oes] not support it”); LARMAN, supra note 69, at 34 (describing the
importance of a firm’s culture to the agile method); LEFFINGWELL, SCALING SOFTWARE AGILITY,
supra note 69, at 92 (describing corporate culture as a fundamental impediment to agile methods);
LEFFINGWELL, AGILE SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 66, at 391 (describing agile culture
as a fundamental principle of the agile method).
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expertise, practice, and culture—including those applied to IT
systems—reflect the practices, policies, and cultural norms associated
with large weapons systems programs.”199 The problem is those
methods are incongruous with challenges unique to software; software
development is not major weapons acquisitions. Continuing, the
National Research Council explains, “there is a long-standing
reluctance to deviate from standard weapons system acquisition
processes, and acquisition personnel are not trained or led to
differentiate the unique aspects of IT systems acquisition.”200 So DoD
procurement personnel resist treating software differently from what
they know best: the sequential methods used for other acquisitions.201
Second, to restate an obvious point mentioned above, the DoD is
by its very nature a hierarchical organization.202 So too is its acquisition
culture.203 Thus, agile methods clash with that culture, the former being
bottom-up and latter top-down. And it would thus seem that DoD
personnel may prefer the sense of control that waterfall confers: plans
are made from on high, the design follows strict requirements, and
delivery is to conform with the plan.204
Third, caution also plays a role. Project managers are used to
“following [a] plan with minimal change,” whereas agile “focuses on
adapting successfully to inevitable changes.”205 It isn’t only that
waterfall is more familiar, but also that waterfall is considered safer—
a stable option with fewer risks is alluring. As the incumbent, it may
seem “safe” or “conservative,” but this is illusory. In fact, choosing
waterfall is a “dangerous decision that can drastically increase
programmatic risk” and too often results in “total project failure.”206
Yet this is often lost on the putatively risk averse.
199. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 4 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 33.
201. LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 14 (recounting DoD’s “longstanding reluctance to deviate
from standard weapons system acquisition processes,” which generally use waterfall).
202. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
203. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–41 (explaining that the DoD
prefers waterfall’s hierarchical structure); DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at
37–38 (describing “log jams” and bureaucratic processes whereby myriad functional
organizations can slow down or even stop programs that do not satisfy their concerns).
204. That is not to say there are not reasons for its hierarchical culture. “Given the criticality
and danger of its mission, its worldwide operations and large workforce, and the frequent need
for clear, decisive action, the Department of Defense, by its nature, is an organization with a
classic command-and-control culture.” NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40.
205. Id. at 40–41; see also Broadus, supra note 184, at 9 (contrasting traditional DoD culture
where “the focus is on following the plan with minimal change” with agile procurement where
“the focus is on adapting successfully to inevitable change”).
206. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 47.
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Finally, ignorance of what the procurement laws and regulations
allow, though not purely a cultural issue, has discouraged the use of
agile. Although statutes and regulations have allowed iterative methods
for nearly two decades, this confusion still exists.207 Lapham cites a
“widespread perception” that agile conflicts with DFARS 5000.01 and
5000.02,208 when that is not the case.209 DoD contractors share this
confusion.210 Thus, ignorance remains a problem.
Because the problem is mainly cultural, tweaking the regulations
is not the solution; the people matter far more than the policy. Agile
reforms will not work until the culture changes. Procurement
professionals must know their options, must understand what agile is,
and must be committed to applying it. This is mainly a function of
better training, which may include better centralized training211 or
“embedded” agile experts to assist with training.212 Lapham suggests
that in order to change the culture, agile reforms should be gradual.213
Whatever the solution, the important thing is that people are the
answer: procurement personnel making decisions and implementing
policy on a daily basis will make or break agile reforms. Better
regulations, no matter how well-worded, cannot do that.
C. To the Extent That Federal Procurement Law and
Regulations Are To Blame, There Are Several Reforms
That May Help
“[I]t is tempting,” Abraham Maslow quipped, “if the only tool you
have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”214 Lawyers
are susceptible to the same sort of category error, but laws are our
hammers. We rarely see a problem that cannot be solved with a new or
improved law or regulation.
Yet the reluctance to embrace agile is not mainly a legal problem.
As described in the previous section, other forces are at work—such as

207. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
208. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 49.
209. See supra note 189.
210. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 11.
211. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Balter, Toward a More Agile Government: The Case for
Rebooting Federal IT Procurement, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 149, 168–69 (2011) (recommending
additional training for contracting officers and other procurement professionals); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 40–41 (lamenting that the Defense Acquisition University
lacks “a comprehensive program to teach IT program management or IT test and evaluation”).
212. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 21.
213. Id. at 43 (describing a process for developing an agile acquisitions culture in the DoD).
214. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE (1966).
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culture, training, and inertia—and are much more important.
Nevertheless certain legal or regulatory reforms may help to a degree,
and we turn to those now.
In a passage in his book on the French Revolution, British
philosopher and MP Edmund Burke contrasts easy and hard reforms.
Easy reforms, he argues, can be made by mobs just well as by
parliaments.215 He continues:
The shallowest undertaking the rudest hand is more than equal to
that task. Rage and [f]renzy will pull down more in half an hour,
than prudence deliberation and foresight can build up in an hundred
years. The errors and defects of old establishments are visible and
palpable. It calls for little ability to point them out. . . . To make
every thing the reverse of what they have been is quite as easy as to
destroy.216

This he contrasts with true progress, which is much harder won: “At
once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing.”217
This passage reminds us of the law of unintended consequences
and that reforms should be made deliberately; reform and progress are
not the same. We should be mindful not only that acquisition has
undergone much reform in the past 50 years (and not all for the
better)218 and of the defects with cyber procurement, but also that there
is much that is right about our system; some maintain the United States’
acquisition system is the “envy of the world.”219 Notwithstanding what
seem like serious defects with software procurement catalogued above

215.
216.
217.

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 247 (2d ed. 1790).
Id.
Id. He elaborates:
When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is superadded is
to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady persevering attention,
various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an
understanding fruitful in expedients are to be exercised; they are to be exercised in
continued conflict with the combined force of opposite vices; with the obstinacy
that rejects all improvement, and the levity that is fatigued and disgusted with
everything of which it is in possession.
Id. at 247–48.
218. The Department of Defense at High Risk: The Recommendations of the Chief
Management Officer on Acquisition Reform and Related High Risk Areas, Report by the H. Comm.
on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 111–52 (2009) (describing 130 studies on acquisition processes
since World War II and a near constant state of change to statute and regulations).
219. See, e.g., Politicizing Procurement: Will President Obama’s Proposal Curb Free
Speech and Hurt Small Business?, Joint Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Business and H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 112th Cong. (May 12, 2011) (testimony of Daniel
I. Gordon, Office of Management and Budget Office of Federal Procurement Policy, stating that
the United States’ acquisition system is the “envy of the world”).
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and a promising solution, any reforms should be made with due care.
Thus, this paper returns to Burke’s notion of genuine progress and the
tradeoffs that come with the procurement reforms in the closing
section.
Having made an extended disclaimer about hasty or careless
reforms, three suggestions seem appropriate. First, we should consider
a new process for IT that works outside the FAR. Second, we ought to
consider eliminating or amending regulations that are inconsistent with
agile. Third, Congress ought to reduce scrutiny over IT to facilitate
agile development.
The FAR spans over 2,000 pages.220 Some argue this complexity
entails excessive transaction costs,221 discourages the best in the private
sector from competing,222 and—most importantly here—is
incompatible with agile.223 Not all federal contracting dollars flow
through the FAR,224 so one option would be to carve out an exception
for IT acquisitions.225 Cooperative research and development
agreements,226 or the DoD’s authority to enter into what are called
“other transactions” for certain research projects,227 may serve as
models. Adapting the FAR and the myriad sub-regulations and culture
implementing it may be impossible. Notwithstanding the lengthy
Burke quote, good authority from an even older source holds that
sometimes it is preferable to pour new wine into new bottles, else the
220. While this page count is considerable, it still pales in comparison to the Internal
Revenue Service code, which doubled in size from 2003 to 2011, reaching 3.8 million words or
73,954 pages. Companies and the State, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT), Feb. 22, 2014, at 14
(giving word count and describing the influence of corporate lobbies on the growth in the IRS
regulations); WOLTERS KLUWER, FEDERAL TAX LAW KEEPS ADDING UP (2013),
http://www.cch.com/TaxLawPileUp.pdf (giving page count for the 2013 CCH STANDARD
FEDERAL TAX REPORTER).
221. See Challenges to Doing Business with the Department of Defense: Findings of the
Panel on Business Challenges in the Defense Industry, H. Comm. on Armed Services 112th Cong.
(Mar. 19, 2012) (describing the high cost associated with contracting or otherwise doing business
with the federal government, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, et al.).
222. See, e.g., Johnson & Reed, supra note 47.
223. See Balter, supra note 211, at 165–66 (arguing a preference for competition over
quality, long lead times, and stable requirements make the current system incompatible with
agile).
224. CIBINIC ET AL., supra note 118, at 14–25 (explaining that the government engages a
variety of non-FAR contractual arrangements).
225. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 35–36 (quoting Secretary Gates’s
article, supra note 45, recommending that exceptions be carved out for warfighters’ critical
needs).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2013) (authorizing directors of federal laboratories to enter
CRADAs).
227. 10 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (2013) (granting DoD this authority for prototyping projects).
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new wine burst the old bottles.228 That is, it may be time to write a new
IT-acquisition regulation uncontaminated by its predecessor.
If carving out an exception for IT proves untenable, we ought to
consider revising acquisition laws and regulations to make them more
compatible with agile. To take but one example, Lapham notes that a
“particular sticking point” is that the DoD 5000 series regulations
require large capstone events such as Critical Design Review.229
Although there are workarounds, ideally regulations would be written
without any lingering bias toward waterfall.230 And this is not the only
conflict between the regulations and agile methods.231 If the DoD is to
adopt agile, its regulations ought to be consistent with that aim.
Third, Congress ought to consider limiting its strict oversight of
DoD IT acquisitions.232 This would runs contrary to recent practice
because starting in 2007 Congress increased oversight to
“unprecedented levels.”233 This includes annual reports to Congress
containing schedules with milestones, implementation schedules, lifecycles cost estimates, and key performance parameters summaries,234
228. See Matthew 9:14–17 (King James).
229. LAPHAM ET AL., supra note 78, at 11; see also DoDI 5000.02, Enclosure 2, ¶ 6.c.(6)
(mandating critical design reviews and several other capstone events).
230. Id. at 13 (explaining that experienced contractors have accommodated the government
and compromised with interim design reviews, which are more compatible with agile).
231. Id. at 12 (describing metrics and “granularity of estimates and task detail” requirements
that are a poor fit for agile); LAPHAM, supra note 53, at 3 (explaining at the FAR and other
acquisition regulations are cumbersome because they were written during the Cold War when the
nation was not engaged in “dynamic warfighting” as it is today). Lapham. shared an anecdote that
captures how just much red tape can encumber software development:
If the government got a requirement to take a simple Hypertext PreProcessor
(PHP)/mySQL-based forum type website that already exists in the .com and simply
move it to the .mil, it could take $3–5 million and a year to complete. This would
include, but not be limited to, documenting a new start, conducting a capabilities
assessment, assigning a program manager, finding a host, doing the justification
and approval, establishing contracts, getting the vendor and “approved” system for
billing, briefing the required oversight groups, and so forth. If this type of
requirement occurred within a commercial environment, it would take about two
hours and less than $1,000.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
232. Congress has imposed a number of “legislative impediments” to agile reforms. For
example, “the total dollar thresholds for designating oversight levels for IT programs are
significantly lower than those used for weapons systems (by a factor of five). This results in a
dichotomy in which an IT system with a development and deployment cost of $126 million over
its life cycle has highly centralized oversight, while a weapons system counterpart at the same
dollar level can be decentralized at the program executive officer level.” See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 44 (citation omitted).
233. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 45–46.
234. Id. at 45; 10 U.S.C. § 2445C (2013) (requiring reports listed above commencing
January 1, 2008).

08_ARTICLE_SCHOENI (DO NOT DELETE)

422

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

6/15/2015 11:39 AM

[Vol. 31

as well as “Nunn-McCurdy-like reporting,”235 whereby IT programs
are judged using a baseline and “[a]ny change in cost, schedule, or
performance that exceed[s] predefined limits will be associated with a
significant or critical change” and “trigger[s] a report to Congress.”236
Such rigid reporting requirements resemble waterfall, trickle down to
individual contracts, and make nominally agile efforts function like
pseudo-waterfall. This is counterproductive, and comes at the same
time Congress is demanding greater use of agile.237 It is as if Congress
were hitting the gas and slamming on the brakes at the same time. If it
is serious about wanting agile to succeed, it must cut the red tape.238
235. This refers to the Nunn–McCurdy Amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act of 1983, which requires special reporting to Congress if a weapon system’s cost per unit
exceeds 15% of the original estimate and the cancelation if it exceeds 25%. See MOSHE
SCHWARTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41293, THE NUNN-MCCURDY ACT:
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (2010); 10 U.S.C. § 2433 (2013)
(codifying the Nunn–McCurdy Act).
236. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 25, at 45–46 (describing several other
reporting and oversight requirements under 10 U.S.C. § 2445C).
237. See NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, § 804, 123 Stat. 2190, 2402–03
(2009) (mandating agile for IT acquisitions).
238. This is, of course, an oversimplification. Detailing a cooperative relationship between
the executive and legislative branches could be a paper unto itself. So this footnote attempts only
to sketch what such a relationship might look like. It proceeds in three parts: first, it describes the
constitutional oversight duties and powers; second, it notes the inherent tension between oversight
and managerial flexibility; third, it offers some thoughts about squaring this circle.
Congress has a constitutional duty of oversight. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
187 (1957) (explaining that the investigative power “is inherent in the legislative process”);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (holding that “the scope of the power of
inquiry, in short, is as penetrating as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the
Constitution”). Congress has several tools at its disposal, including powers to subpoena, hold
hearings, depose, grant immunity, hold in contempt, and bring suit. See MORTON ROSENBERG,
INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 7–15 (2003); MARTIN O. JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 32–37
(2002); JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
56–100 (1976). Contra LANCE COLE & STANLEY M. BRAND, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
AND OVERSIGHT: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 80–82 (2011) (recounting Supreme Court’s
limitations on congressional investigations following the “excesses” of the 1950s). This duty is
heightened for defense expenditures for two reasons. First, the military constitutes the largest
category of discretionary spending, and thus implicates Congress’s duty to oversee the money it
spends. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing “[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury”
except by appropriations bills, establishing the power of the purse); Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111
(linking the breadth and depth of oversight powers to Congress’s appropriation authority). Second,
in addition to the power of the purse, the Constitution grants Congress an important role in the
exercise of military powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power to “declare
war,” “raise and support armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” mobilize state militias, and “provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining” those state militias). This was by design. Having granted
greater military powers to the federal government than existed under the Articles of
Confederation, the framers “split these powers between the legislature and the executive” to
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Though it may be counterintuitive, granting the DoD more flexibility
to apply agile methods may well produce better results than would
more waterfall-type scrutiny from Congress.
CONCLUSION
Returning to where this paper started, the DoD desperately needs
to do IT acquisition faster in order to do its job. Yet it has been slow to
ensure that these powers were not abused. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:
A BIOGRAPHY 114–19 (2005). Foremost among these safeguards was that military appropriations
would last for no more than two years, and that Congress was thereby to keep a watchful eye on
the danger to liberty that standing armies pose. See generally THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
Vol. 3, 122–66 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (assembling the framers’ writings
on the dangers of standing army and the protections afforded by Art. 1, § 8, cl. 11). In short,
Congress must oversee military expenditures both because they are costly and because they are
martial—both of which implicate important congressional roles under the Constitution. Such
long-standing roles should not be taken lightly merely to expedite software development.
Yet congressional oversight is not free. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE:
THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 212–13 (1990) (describing the cost-benefit
tradeoff that comes with any system of oversight); Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control
the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 101, 105–06 (1997) (arguing for the optimal amount of congressional oversight in terms of
political costs and benefits). Perhaps oversight should be balanced against “managerial
flexibility.” See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-117SP, PERFORMANCE
BUDGETING: EFFORTS TO RESTRUCTURE BUDGETS TO BETTER ALIGN RESOURCES WITH
PERFORMANCE 4–8, 13–14 (2005) (recognizing the tradeoffs between “managerial flexibility” and
“congressional control”). Congress should never forsake its constitutionally mandated oversight
duties, but it should nevertheless exercise prudence—lest micromanagement come at the expense
of the flexibility necessary to the proper functioning of the executive agencies—in its exercise of
those duties. “One basic issue cuts across most of the problems,” Bernard Rosen explains, is “how
to allow maximum possible independence while assuring adequate accountability.” BERNARD
ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 54–56 (3rd ed. 1998).
It seems any viable executive-legislative relationship would exhibit at least three features.
First, government personnel—whether employees or contractors—ought to be given “the legal,
fiscal, and political independence” in order “to gain freedom from hierarchical control . . . in such
matters as setting intermediate goals, establishing and applying standards,” etc. ROSEN, supra, at
54 (summarizing Harvey Mansfield, Independence and Accountability for Federal Contractors
and Grantees, in THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY (Bruce L.R. Smith ed., 1975)). That would mean
less congressional scrutiny of milestones and the like, which are the bane of agile. Second, perhaps
Congress ought to focus more on policy and less on management. Consultant Peter Drucker long
counseled that elected officials are incapable of effective management, and ought to focus instead
on policy. See PETER DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY 219–20 (1969). Following Drucker,
perhaps Congress ought to operate at a strategic level and leave day-to-day tactical decisions to
agency managers. Third, Congress would do well to constrain its oversight activities in order
maximize their efficacy because a recent study suggests that less is more. Counterintuitively,
increasing the number of committees “monitoring and potentially directing agency
policymaking,” lessens its influence and “undercut[s] the ability of Congress to respond
collectively to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.” See Joshua D. Clinton, David E.
Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight,
57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2013). Of course, much more could be written, but hopefully this
provides a basic outline of how a healthy executive-legislative relationship might work.
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adopt the agile reforms that have swept across the private industry. The
previous section reviewed some regulatory obstacles, but none of those
preclude agile.239 Instead, the problem is that although laws and
regulations use the jargon, “agile” acquisition is a misnomer as the DoD
is stuck in the past, using methods discredited decades ago. There are
regulatory obstacles, but the problem is mainly cultural.
Returning to Burke,240 reforms can be harmful and progress does
not come easily. We ought to take care before too hastily changing to a
system that, all things considered, works fairly well—with the notable
exception of cyber procurement. We should be wary of the inevitable
tradeoffs.241 Transparency is first among these. With agile we lose the
top-down controls waterfall afforded, and may thereby lose some
transparency. Yet that loss is not without recompense, and we may gain
more than we lose.
Some argue that far from diminishing transparency, agile
increases it. That is, while waterfall gives the false impression of
transparency, agile delivers the real thing. Waterfall measures success
against a standard established before development started; agile
updates those standards in real-time, as end users provide feedback on
each new iteration. Genuine transparency, the argument goes, is what
makes agile both painful to adopt and worthwhile.242
Burke would counsel that when it comes to reforms, like
Hippocrates, our watchword ought to be “first, do no harm.” Yet even
if agile resulted in lost transparency, it may still be worth the price.
After all, a pristine system is not free; we pay not only in terms of
formal controls, but also opportunity cost. At some point, surely value
outweighs transparency. As described above,243 the DoD has reached
that point. It pays far too much for software that takes too long to
develop and under-delivers. The time has come for agile reform.244

239. See supra note 189 (citing several studies indicating that federal procurement law and
regulations do not preclude agile software development).
240. See supra notes 215–217 and accompanying text.
241. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives For a System of Government
Contract Law, 2 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 103, 103–09 (2002) (describing tradeoffs in public
procurement policy among principles of competition, integrity, transparency, efficiency, customer
satisfaction, best value, wealth distribution, risk avoidance, and uniformity).
242. I am indebted to Mr. Mark Schwartz, Chief Information Officer at United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), who read an earlier version of this paper, for this
insight.
243. See Sections II.B and II.C, supra.
244. If, as suggested above, supra note 242, and accompanying text, transparency isn’t lost
in the bargain, so much the better. It might be that agile increases genuine transparency. If so, agile
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Whatever its effect on transparency, agile is an idea whose time
has come. The DoD and Congress should dispense with rhetoric and
develop a culture and regulatory framework consistent with the agile
methods. That will not be easy.
Another challenge is the tension between agile and
cybersecurity.245 This paper has dwelt primarily on the need for timelier
solutions to the DoD’s needs because an acquisition cycle fast enough
to keep up with the technology’s rapid growth is essential to meeting
those needs. But speed is not everything. Sometimes secure systems
may come at the expense of speed, cost, or quality; a system that is late,
costly, or ineffective may be preferable to one that is unsecure.
Harnessing agile’s advantages while also recognizing and
compensating for its disadvantages will not be easy.246
Genuine agile reforms may not be easy, but they are urgent.
Returning to the dangers catalogued at the outset,247 cyber warfare
presents the DoD with unprecedented challenges—especially given
software development would not only be cheaper, faster, and of better quality, it might also
increase, not decrease, the integrity of our procurement system.
245. The tension between any agile methods or any form of rapid development methods and
developing secure systems is well documented. See, e.g., Steffen Bartsch, Practitioners’
Perspectives on Security in Agile Development, Sixth International Conference on Availability,
Reliability and Security, IEEE CONF. PUB. 479–84 (2011) (summarizing several studies on the
tension between agile and cybersecurity).
246. Some argue that agile can be adapted to security or that they are not mutually exclusive.
See, e.g., SIMON BROWN, SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE FOR DEVELOPERS (2013) (arguing there is
no conflict between agile and architecture); Stephany Bellomo & Carol Woody, DOD
INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND AGILE: CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS GATHERED
THROUGH INTERVIEWS WITH AGILE PROGRAM MANAGERS AND DOD ACCREDITATION
REVIEWERS 1–2, 15 (2012) (suggesting agile is a net benefit to security as “shorter iterations make
problems visible sooner so problems can be fixed earlier”); Deborah L. Farroha & Bassam S.
Farroha, Agile Development for System of Systems: Cyber Security Integration into Information
Repositories Architecture, 2011 Systems Conference IEEE CONF. PUB. (2011) (advocating a
systems architecture that both utilizes agile methods and ensures security); Nancy R. Mead, et al.,
Venkatesh Viswanathan & Deepa Padmanabhan, Incorporating Security Requirements
Engineering into the Dynamic Systems Development Method, Annual IEEE International
Computer Software and Applications Conference, IEEE CONF. PUB. 949–54 (2011) (attempting
to reconcile agile with security); Hossein Keramati & Seyed-Hassan Mirian-Hosseinabadi,
Integrating Software Development Security Activities with Agile Methodologies, IEEE/ACS
International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications IEEE CONF. PUB. 749–54
(2008) (attempting to reconcile agile and security); Mikko Siponen, et al., Integrating Security
into Agile Development Methods, Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences, IEEE CONF. PUB. 1–7 (2005) (acknowledging conflict between secure and agile
software development and suggesting how to harmonize the two); Konstantin Beznosov &
Philippe Kruchten, Towards Agile Security Assurance, in NSPW ‘04: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2004
NEW SECURITY PARADIGMS WORKSHOP 47–54 (ACM 2004) (identifying four security assurance
methods, arguing that two of them clash with agile, and suggesting “ways of alleviating the
conflict”).
247. See supra Sections II.A and II.B.
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that 90% of its weapons systems’ functionality depends on software.248
And the DoD lacks the tools to defend itself or to fight in the cyber
domain because its IT-acquisition process is far too slow to keep pace
with technological growth.249 Fortunately, the arsenal of democracy250
has provided a solution in the form of the agile software-development
method. It’s time for DoD IT acquisitions to do and to be agile, and not
just rhetorically.

248.
249.
250.

See supra note 25.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra note 3.

